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No. 2074

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## NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

### ALGERIAN FISHERY DELEGATION'S VISIT REPORTED

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 20 Dec 79 p 20

[Text] The delegation from the Algerian secretariat of State for Fishing arrived in Nouakchott on 11 December for a working visit in our country, and Tuesday evening it flew to its own country after visiting the port installations of Nouakchott and Nouadhibou.

During its stay in Mauritania the delegation, with the national leaders of the ministry of Planning and Fishing, studied the possibilities of starting up the cooperation between the two countries again in the field of fishing, particularly reactivating the Algerian-Mauritanian Fishing Company (ALMAP).

The Algerian delegation was led by Ahmed Abdallahi, director of planning in the Algerian secretariat of State for Fishing.

On the other hand, the Algerian television mission also left the capital on Tuesday for its own country.

The talks dealt chiefly with ways and means likely to strengthen the cooperation in matters of fishing between our two countries.

8946

CSO: 4400

REPERCUSSIONS OF RISE IN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM EXAMINED

Paris LE MONDE in French 23, 25-26 Nov 79

[Article by Paul Balta]

[23 Nov 79, p 5]

[Text] It is certainly no accident that demonstrations took place in Tehran, Islamabad and Mecca on Wednesday, 21 November: they reflect the unrest felt by the entire Moslem world, which celebrated the first day of the 15th century of the Hegira (hijrah in Arabic) or the 1400th anniversary of Mohammed's flight to Medina, marking the beginning of the Moslem calendar. Exposed to the Meccan population's hostility, whose idolatry he rebuked, Mohammed actually emigrated in 622 A.D. to Yathrib, which took the name of Medinat-El-Nabi (City of the Prophet), where he reigned as political and religious leader until his death in 632.

Islam was very quickly split by a political-religious schism, which hinged on a point of doctrine involving the struggle for power. Standing on the egalitarian principles preached by the Koran, a Moslem faction advocated appointment of the caliph, or supreme leader of the faithful, by the majority. This was the case of the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, Omar and Osman. However, the followers of Ali, the fourth caliph and the son in law of the prophet, whose daughter Fatima he had married, felt that the caliphate rightfully belonged to the prophet's descendants. Ali was assassinated in Koufa, his capital, in northern Iraq after being defeated by Moanviya, who set up the caliphate in Damascus. The son of Ali, Hussein, was in turn murdered in 680 in Kerbela by the caliph Yazid.

Birth of Shiism

This double murder gave rise to Shiism (shi'a means sect in Arabic) in opposition to the Sunnites (supporters of tradition in Arabic), who are the majority in the Moslem world. It is estimated that the number of Moslems in the world is currently about 1 billion. They live in a geographic area that stretches from the Atlantic (Morocco) to the Pacific (Indonesia) and from the Mediterranean (Maghreb, Middle East) to the Gulf of Benin (Nigeria).

The Shiites, estimated at about 90 million, are the majority in Iran (33 million) and have sizable minorities in Iraq (about 50 percent of the population), in the Persian Gulf, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Lebanon.

From a purely theological and doctrinal standpoint, there are no essential differences between the Sunnites and Shiites, who belong to the ummah (community of the faithful) and who respect the five pillars of Islam: profession of faith (There is no god but god and Mohammed is his prophet), prayer, almsgiving (zakat), the fast of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca (if possible). This is also true of the sects which have arisen within these two major divisions, such as the kharijites ("those who have departed"), who abandoned Ali to rejoin the Sunnites but who are particularly strict and puritanical and have become established in north Africa, or the ismailians and alaouites (Syria), related to the Shiites.

From a purely political standpoint, it is believed that there were four great caliphates: 1) the Eastern Caliphate (632-1258), which successively ruled in Medina, Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo; 2) the Umayyad Caliphate of Cordoba (902-1031), opposed to that of Damascus; 3) the Fatimid Caliphate (909-1011), whose seat was moved from north Africa to Egypt; 4) the Ottoman Caliphate (1517-1924), which ended with the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of modern Turkey.

After the golden age, followed by a brilliant period from the seventh to the 11th or to the 14th-15th centuries, according to historians the Arab-Moslem world went through a decadent stage. It subsequently entered a period of upheaval in the middle of the 19th century from the shock of colonialism, but at the same time it experienced what is called the Nahda (renaissance) through the impetus of two great reformers, Afghani and Abdo, who sought to reconcile the return to basics and the opening onto the modern world.

Divided by the interplay of political forces, shaken by the intrusion of Zionism between the two world wars, goaded by the creation of the Israeli nation in 1948, the Arab-Moslem world has continued to emerge as an autonomous force internationally since the end of the 1939-45 conflict. It has done so through men as different as Faisal of Arabia, the traditionalist, and Nasser, the modernist, before the advent of the socialist Boumediene and Qadhafi, theoretician of the "third path" between capitalism and communism. For several years we have witnessed a recovery of Islam in countries as secular as Tunisia and Turkey, but more particularly in Iran, where Iman Khomeyni proclaimed an Islamic republic in the beginning of the year. However, this religious revival has not led to a rapprochement at the level of political leaders.

[25-26 Nov 79, pp 1, 2]

The vast majority of Europeans note with amazement and often with fear the turmoil periodically shaking Arab and Moslem countries. In Tehran, in Islamabad, today in Mecca, yesterday in Kabul, more recently in Beirut, formerly in Cairo or Algiers, the feverish outbursts have continued to jolt the Islamic



world since the end of World War II. In an initial stage with Mosaddeq, Nasser, the Algerian FLN, Syrian and Iraqi Ba'athists, these jolts have taken on a nationalistic hue; a distinctly religious tint has been added for several years.

How can these phenomena be explained, sometimes described in excessive terms. Today Mosaddeq, Nasser, Bourguiba and Boumediene almost seem like moderates; their approach appears rational and coherent and their nationalism is now understood if not accepted in the West. But we should not forget: for having nationalized Iranian oil, the man whom his countrymen called the "old lion" was considered by the West as an "enemy to be defeated." For having recovered the Suez Canal, Nasser was described by extremists as a "new Hitler," just like Bourguiba, who dared to demand independence for his country.

The explanation of the jolts sometimes setting Arab and Moslem countries against each other and, more often, their peoples against the West, is found at various levels. First of all there is history, which has left deep scars: "wars of religion" in the Middle Ages with the Crusades, colonial expeditions undertaken in the 19th century in the name of civilization, contemporary "ideological confrontations." All of these events have always reflected relationships of force whose stakes are economic, even if they are cloaked in moral considerations.

Whether they were colonized directly (the case of most Arab nations and several African and Asian Moslem countries) or indirectly through the interplay of unfair treaties imposing de facto alliances (Iran, Turkey ...), the countries of the Islamic world were subjected to the stranglehold of Europe for a century. This gradually gave way to what Moslem peoples call "American imperialism."

"Soviet imperialism"--more recent--has not been felt in the same way because it is more ideological; moreover, leaders who have had to conclude tactical alliances with the Kremlin know that they can rely on popular sentiment to stem its penetration. It may in fact be noted that most Moslems remain rather receptive to the idea of socialism, probably because the Koran is an egalitarian treatise, but they are highly sensitive to atheistic communism.

The deep hostility to American imperialism derives from several factors, the most important of which is undeniably the creation of Israel and the support which the United States has always given the Hebrew nation. Another major factor: oil and all its related problems, including that of capital invested in Western banks. This has led to contradictions within the Arab world itself, quite often creating a gap between the people and their leaders.

The case is similar with regard to problems of development. From Rabat to Lahore, the man in the street does not understand that certain oil producers, Saudi Arabia in particular, are playing the United States' strategic game and investing their capital in Western banks, preferably American banks, instead of contributing more generously to the development of Arab or Moslem countries which lack hydrocarbons.

The fear which Imam Khomeyni instills in the Persian Gulf Emirates, and among moderate governments of the Arab world, derives from the fact that, contrary to what is believed in the West, his political argument is extremely popular; it is even more so, since as an Iranian, he provides a lesson for chiefs of state that their "Arabness" should do more to solidify Palestinian resistance. The fact that the Iranian David holds the head of the American Goliath can only inflame or indeed mobilize the Arab mobs.

#### Double Talk

Imam Khomeyni's moral argument finds the same response even if many Iranian Shiite clerics behave quite hypocritically. In fact, on the pretext of respect for the national and religious sentiment of Arab and Moslem peoples, most established governments claim that Koranic precepts are rigorously applied. But the attitude of leaders often contrasts with the rules which they would have the majority respect.

A few examples: in Saudi Arabia, there are no movies, but princes pay exorbitant prices to rent films from Paris, London or New York and have them shown in their gardens or palaces, while whisky and champagne flow in abundance; an ordinary individual caught drinking alcohol would be subject to the punishments stipulated by the sacred book. Eminent persons go to Cairo and European capitals--since Beirut has been stricken with civil war--to obtain loose women or to frantically indulge in gambling forbidden by Koranic law.

In many other instances, people concerned about morality know how to show tolerance: outside of self-righteous or activist groups, Maghrebians are hardly offended that immigrant workers who have returned to their country retain the habit of drinking acquired in cooler countries; similarly, for example, Iranians and Afghans living on the high plateaus are not shocked at seeing their countrymen consume alcohol.

#### Explosive Memories

In addition to political and moral reasons, there are sociological and psychological causes: industrialization, introduced at an accelerated rate for a quarter-century, imposes stress for which peoples of rural origin are not prepared. It changes the rhythms of family life and leads to imbalances within society, while at the same time divorce is on the rise among part of the Westernized middle class and the great mass of rural residents.

The memory of peoples is selective, like that of individuals: the underprivileged living in the Islamic world retain memories which we have a tendency to suppress and which can become explosive under certain circumstances, such as the Madagascar massacres, the victims of the Vietnamese and Algerian wars, the tripartite Suez expedition, the coups d'etat promoted by the United States and others, the 60,000-odd persons executed under the shah's regime ...

More generally, it cannot be forgotten that the Arab and Moslem world, located on the doorstep of industrial Europe, for a quarter-century has been undergoing a change which is a veritable upheaval. Confronting the West, which itself is experiencing a serious moral and economic crisis, and while their society is being torn between often agnostic Westernized elite classes and a mass of believers, these people may be tempted, goaded by Moslem activists, to rediscover their roots in religion. But religious fervor for the Koranic ideal may be engulfed in the violence of self-righteousness. This is what has happened in Iran.

11915

CSO: 4800

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS DISCUSSED

Casablanca LAMALIF in French Dec 79 pp 4-11

[Article by Jibril Mohamed: "The Age of Islamic Movements"]

[Text] The reason for which the events in Iran and Saudi Arabia with their various implications trigger passions both in the Moslem and the Western world (consequently, becoming predominant on the world scale), is not only because of dramatic circumstances within which they are taking place but, above all, the scope of the upheavals or confrontations which they appear to presage. In any case, one essential factor in the world scene is increasingly making itself be known: political Islam in its various manifestations. It will be through its external and internal context that we shall try here to determine some of the main lines of its current evolution which is as rapid as it is complex.

As a matter of fact, why have such diverse yet increasing recourses to the invocation of a part of justice meting Islam which provides a type of catharsis in the area of relations ethics within societies and states? It is true that the same topics, taken up within the context of a single tradition, are reinterpreted and emphasized differently. Whereas unanimity exists on the fact that within Islam the religious and secular aspects are inseparable, discussions and confrontations deal with the way through which such principles could be inserted within social and political practices. More or less fundamentalist, ideologies based on Islam or Islamic movements appear to be contesting Islam to ideologies considered less clerical, and their liberal or Marxist-leaning statements. They would like to take over both the requirements of an exacerbated nationalism in the face of imperialist domination and of the remodeling of a still rather uncertain society which, however, emphasizes moral values (equity, communal solidarity, austere habits, etc.), as a reaction against the traumas resulting from peripheral "modernism." Is it a question of a mutation caused by the failures and lack of adaptations experienced by the various currents based on modernism? Or else, is it a question of a crisis expressing the confusion and current impasses experienced by Moslem countries and, more generally, by the Third World,

where the expectation of a more credible social and cultural development plan triggers Utopian dreams of returning to hallowed models?

It is against the background of such problems that we should try to place the great variety of statements and practices of current Islamic movements.

The extent of the confrontation caused by the visit of the ex-Shah to the United States, the seizing of hostages at the American Embassy in Teheran, and their dramatic developments emphasize the depth of the change which has taken place in Iran in terms of what is commonly called the "Islamic revolution," and enables us to determine the multiple reasons for the impact which it has triggered in neighboring countries and, in a latent fashion, in a large part of the Islamic world. First of all, there is the anti-American unanimity displayed by all Iranian political forces.

Certainly, the desire for revenge has not been absent from this display of unanimity and passionate mobilization.

Yet, is it only, as has been written, a case of the need to boost up the zeal of a nation whose "natural inclination does not lead to fundamentalism" and to prevent the revolution from becoming listless?

In any case, we are faced with a process distinguished both by internal struggles and unquestionable anti-imperialist radicalism. Relations with the United States will probably be resumed on a less heated level. However, the desire to break with the forms of imperialist domination so far familiar to the country is unquestionable. It is above all this that is manifested in the violence of the challenge hurled at the United States.

#### A Non-Monolithic Republic

With all this, everything is far from being simple and monolithic in the young Islamic republic. It is thus that, without breaking with Khomeyni, leaders such as ex-prime minister Mehdi Bazargan or Bani Sadr, considered one of the most influential leaders and theoreticians of the revolution, have openly criticized the taking of American hostages by Islamic students. Bazargan had already emphasized that the government had been paralyzed by the parallel and predominant action of the mullahs who, regardless of the substantial role they played in ensuring the country's independence, were not, in his view, suitable to manage current affairs.

Bani Sadr, who seems more likely to integrate within the policy of the state the basic requirements expressed by Khomeyni, nevertheless, is sensitive to the factual consequences of the actions of the new republic. He reminded the Islamic students that alienating part of Western public opinion was an error, the more so since it is, said he, "looking for a new spirituality, a new international morality," and could help to extradite the Shah and prevent the isolation of the country.



Therefore, this is a context showing anti-imperialist unanimity but with nuances as to the nature of the means implied by this attitude and, furthermore, with persisting political and cultural cleavage. To wit, the referendum on the constitution which, despite the atmosphere of fervor and anti-American mobilization, involved the very modest participation assessed at no more than 50 percent of the electorate and even triggered a severe tension in Azerbaijan where demonstrations took place confronting supporters of Ayatollah Shari'at Madari to the Khomeyni force. Even though Shari'at Madari may be considered by the Islamic left and the communists (Tudeh) as the "representative of the big bourgeoisie linked with the monopolies," nevertheless, he enjoys the support of 14 million Azerbaijanis and of the extreme Marxist left (the People's Fedayin).

The Iranian political chessboard is, therefore, equally diverse and fluctuating, despite the tendency shown by the Khomeyni forces to establish the ever more centralized control of the powers that be. So far, problems related to the structure of the state (nationalities such as the Kurds and the Azerbaijanis rejecting the centralizing model), and the concentration of power, have been predominant. Do they conceal social options and cultural differences? What is the role here of the Islamic movement?

#### Toward a Point of No Return

Everything points out that whereas a consensus exists as to the anti-imperialist nature of the revolution and the exigency of a new political and social system displaying greater religious spirituality, there is little unanimity as to the implementation of specific orientations and structures. Diverging concepts and interests are always manifested within a rather peculiar context through struggles whose outcome is still difficult to predict or even whose factual dynamics is difficult to understand.

Khomeyni's authority extends over movements which appear to be the most radical both in terms of independence and anti-imperialist activism (petroleum politics, challenge to the United States, etc.) as well as in terms of integration (on the level of customs, cadres, and ideological militancy) and equalitarian populism (references to the most poor is a constant in Khomeyni's speeches, calling for the application of Islamic justice). Does this fermentation of a variety of actions, which is not without contradictions, obey a clear vision of the objectives to be reached, based on a defined strategy, or else does it aim, first of all, at creating a no-return situation on the various levels, which would make possible a remelting of a society which would have been thus, in advance, cleansed from the slag of a long past of "corruption on earth?" Hence the emphasis (which should not be ignored and which acts here as a political factor as well) underneath for a way of life which would be more virtuous and more austere, i.e., which would prepare society to break with the old consumption models and lay the foundations of new social relations, even though the new models and relations cannot as yet

be defined and expressed in specific terms. Are we witnessing an attempted transition which would involve the entire society based on the religious and ethical imperatives?

This would mean that such a transition would involve several possible outcomes in which Islam would be the common element. Which trend will predominate? Beyond the current activist stage, would the Khomeyni movement develop a more specific formulation (whether more rigid, as manifested by Qotbzadeh, the present minister of foreign affairs, or subtler, as expressed by Bani Sadr, emphasizing the sole application of the stipulations of the shari'a to the management of the state or drawing its inspiration from Ali Shari'ati, spokesman for an equalitarian and Third World-oriented Islam)?

Otherwise, and should internal strifes worsen, would other leaders, such as Ayatollah Shari'at Madari or nonreligious parties, such as the National Movement (currently in the background) see their role expand along with a definition of another type of republic?

#### Invocation of Divinity

The reason for dwelling on the events in Iran is that the debates and the struggles which are taking place within it could, with some variations, occur in other Moslem countries. In any case, they identify the factual political and social implications of this invocation of the divinity in the face of the problems of our age.

The grave events which took place in Mecca, as of the dawn of 1 Muharram of the year 1400 of the Hegira, showed quite well, in addition to the sacrilegious aspect of the armed occupation of the al-Masjid al-Haram, the topical nature of the politicization of religious symbolism. Characteristically, the Arab chiefs of state, holding their summit meeting in Tunis, denounced this action imputed by Ryad to a "fanatical and heretical sec," whereas in Iran and Pakistan it was ascribed to "American-Zionist provocation," even though, according to the scant proof offered, it would have been a case of an attempted internal insurrection (even if elements other than Saudi may have also participated). According to a (Moroccan) pilgrim who was present at the onset of the action of the insurgents, their chief, Muhamed 'Abdallah al-'Utaybah, a student at Mecca's Islamic University, purportedly denounced the regime "of whose oppression the Saudi populations the victims, . . . and the economic, moral, and social degradation experienced by the country (see LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 3 December 1979). It is noteworthy to recall, in this connection, the 10 October statement by Sadat, who said that "the emirs of the Saudi family do not know now what to do to face the internal troubles which threaten them. . . . Pamphlets were recently distributed in Arabia by the opposition to the regime, criticizing the frenetic liking of the princes for gambling, forbidden by Koranic Law."<sup>2</sup> Whereas the

constituent part of the forces involved in this attempted insurrection, carried out in the name of Islam, is not yet exactly known, it is evident that we are facing a certain political crisis.

After the crushing of the 1969 military conspiracy, the assassination of King Faysal in 1975, and the differences which surfaced in the spring of 1979 among the princes (on the attitude to be taken toward the United States and the Camp David agreements), what is the scope of this new crisis? The development of the country raises a number of questions which deal with reforms to be made, the eagerness displayed by young cadres coming from the middle classes to become involved, the disparities, the loss of old ties and relations within a society which is becoming ever more sedentary and urbanized, to which we must add the appearance of an underproletariat consisting of emigrants from Arab countries, Pakistan, the Phillipines, etc. . . . which could also become sources of tension.

In this country which, so far, seemed the most theocratic and traditionalist in the world of Islam, the appearance of an opposition movement which invokes Islam is significant.

While concern is spreading among the Gulf emirates (as well as Iraq), we are witnessing the growth of movements which also invoke Islam, whether secular of the Marxist type (Afghanistan) or liberal (Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey), or else "progressive" (Syria, Algeria). As to regimes which claim to be Islamic, the one of Zia Ul Haq, in Pakistan, very conservative, appears to be trying to go one better (in terms of customs and punishments) to mislead masses which are quite sensitive to religion. However, for how long could it avoid an opposition to the social system which it is defending with the fist, and would the Islamic wave not risk turning against it?

Al-Qadhdhafi's Islamic-reformist regime is being criticized by some fundamentalists who reproach him his daring deeds (such as his wish to deprive the religious authorities from their prerogatives and to question the validity of the Sunnah, the Koran alone being considered the base,<sup>3</sup> even though, despite the official populist activism, the country does not seem to be experiencing major social tensions.

#### Political Invocation of Islam

In any case, the invocation of Islam as the regenerator of political and social life and, therefore, the new connotations given to various reinterpreted subjects within Islamic tradition, are the new feature within the general political context of the Moslem world, indispensable if we are to understand the evolution underway, going beyond the various current circumstances. This desire to reformulate, based on the authority of invoking a just and cleansing Islam, of political and social problems, which could be reclassified, generically, as the Islamic movement, reflects the diversity and contradictions of a string of situations and

needs generated by the evolution of the postcolonial countries, despite its support of unity and community mystique.

The variety of situations is consistent with a variety of statements, aims, and methods used.

Is the increased volume of references to Islam in the various Moslem countries boosted by a spreading Iranian example? Evident though this might seem, nevertheless, we should consider the diversity and specificity of situations involving open or latent crises.

It is true that such movements do not carry everywhere the same degree of activism or the same impact. However, we could already note that, beyond the diversity of the regimes they oppose, they express a profound malaise within society and even civilization, and that is what gives them a potential which has become frightening despite the ambiguous political attitudes which they could trigger and the possibilities for various manipulations to which they could yield themselves.

#### The Islamic Dissertation

Consequently, we should single out within the Islamic dissertation its references to tradition, on the one hand, and the particular significance which such references assume within a given political set of circumstances or a specific phase in the evolution of a given society, on the other.

The discussion whose virulence proves that the objective is not merely scholastic deals with the topic of returning to the stipulations of the Law (Shar'iah) and the example of the tradition of the Prophet and his companions (or the Shi'ite imams), aimed at reforming and guiding Islamic states and societies. The fundamentalists claim that the Koran and tradition contain not only the principles but rules and specific laws which can cover at all times the organization and leadership of the community in the right way. The secular postcolonial countries are affected, for they are charged with borrowing from the West a number of its laws, economic and social practices, customs, etc. However, this dissertation, essentially polemic in nature, involves a rich range of nuances. Whereas some invoke the pure and simple return to the model of the tradition of the First Century of the Hegira, going beyond the centuries, others are more concerned with making principles match changing realities; others again emphasize the example of the struggle against oppression which is mobilized by going back to this tradition, along with the application of the ethical imperative to society and its governmental system. Let us emphasize here that the topics of tradition referred to are taken from a single source. However, what is significant is their selection as well as the specific emphasis on one or another of their possible meanings. Let us also consider the fact that the invocation of a principle according

to which Islam the secular cannot be separated from the religious, considering that it is both "din wa dawlah" (not separating faith from the implications of governing the community), assumes here a renewed significance: It is not merely a question of defending the Shari'ah but of legitimizing a political contention against the states.

The recourse to such symbolism seems to confuse further the political dissertation and practices it supports. Occasionally, this even results in paradoxical situations: Thus, in Egypt and Syria, for example, the regimes which are aware (in different degrees) of the social tensions invoke liberal ideology and rationalism to counter an invocation of the principles of moral justice and integrity by fundamentalist opposition, whereas in Afghanistan and Pakistan progressive yet excessively controlled and unadapted reforms have enabled the conservative fundamentalists to strengthen their impact because of popular discontent.

Let us cite here as an example of such oppositions a controversy published by AL-DA'WAH<sup>5</sup>, the journal of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt, criticizing the statement by Sa'id Ashmawi, a progovernment adviser, who believes that a distinction should be made between "religious government" and "civilian government," for "according to divine revelation the government can exist only with a Messenger of God or a Prophet," and that "according to Moslem Law (Shari'ah) the government must be civilian and not religious" and that "the Shari'ah has not codified a definite type of government, unvariable and unchangeable."

The editor in chief of the Egyptian fundamentalist journal challenges this distinction, for, in his view, the Law covers all areas of society and the state, and "whereas he may not have provided a rigid hold as far as the government is concerned," it has, nevertheless, "prescribed the foundations, such as the choice of the governor made by the people through the bay'ah (consensus of allegiance) and the Shura (free concertation), and the exercise of justice, freedom, and equality."

He rejects S. Ashmawi's idea according to which the governments of Islamic countries should be consistent with the "realities of society" since, according to him, Moslems should not elect a government coming from a society which may have "become corrupt and (might have) abandoned Islamic morality and customs."

Facing such different situations, actually, as we shall see later, we are witnessing a shifting of the limits of the political treaties in Islamic countries, as the reference to religious values challenges the legitimacy of "secular" ideologies and the predominance which, following the gaining of independence, they had acquired, based on belief in building a national state which would provide all the benefits of the modern age.



## The Utopia of the Golden Age

Is it only a question of the unattainable Utopia of a return to a kind of golden age, sweeping off the entire turpitude, inequality, and despair of today's world? Or else, on a deeper level, would it be a question of the formulation of the needs of a "deep society," at this stage of the evolution of such needs in the world of today?

Is this a fallback which would be suitable for all kinds of regressions or else the reaching of a maturity by large sectors, so far left on the outside, and which would like to become part of history?

It is the diversification of topics and the political range of fundamentalist movements which identify the evolution which has taken place since 1929, the date of the founding of the Moslem Brotherhood by Hasan al-Banna, in Egypt, then ruled by British colonialism. The essential feature of their program then was to promote the radical and austere morality of society, anticipating a monolithic and homogenizing system (the banning of parties, strengthening of the army, restoration of the Caliphate, strict customs, strictly religious education and culture, etc.). Subsequently, the movement gave birth to several trends, starting with terrorist groups such as Takfir wa al Hijrah and ending with semi-legal groups (whose organ was the newspaper AL DA'WAH), and groups within the "Islamic communities" (university students in particular, who founded fundamentalist "communes" in clusters of houses rented for this purpose, and which are very active in university circles).

This shows a diversification of positions and, therefore, a politicizing of this movement which is, in many ways, more "secularized," reflecting the variety of interests and motivations revealing differences among the groups.

The same occurs in Syria where the activism of the fundamentalists has doubled and was strengthened last summer as a result of a factual massacre at the Aleppo Military School, where 83 officer-students died, and the troubles in Latakia, where a sheik of the Alawite faith was killed, thus triggering a climate of crisis and latent explosion in the country. There as well, three fundamentalist trends are operating, in addition to two other trends within the movement of the Moslem Brotherhood (one current calling for violent action while the other calling for legal action).

In a communique published in Saudi Arabia, Isam al-'Attar, one of the leaders of this movement (in exile in the FRG since 1963), stated that "the Syrian people (were) victims of religious and partisan tyranny, of concealed robbery, and of terrorism opposing fundamental freedoms and values."

This hints at the fact that the regime is relying on the Alawite community, which is in the minority (and which professes a syncretic faith which combines the elements of Shi'ism with other elements inspired by Christianity and which predominates in the army and the governmental machinery, whereas the Sunni community (75 percent of the population) considers itself severely hurt.

Therefore, the fundamentalists are mostly Sunni Moslems and we see that they combine in their attacks against the regime religious grievances with criticism of the policy of the Ba'eh party.<sup>7</sup> In Tunisia, the fundamentalists are waging a campaign in the mosques and among university students against the secularization undertaken by the regime, aiming at, naturally, sensitizing those neglected by the economic and social evolution of the country. In Algeria, strikes and student demonstrations recently took place in Oran and Algiers, and fundamentalist groups, whose impact and significance cannot be precisely assessed, are taking over the discontent of the "Arab-leaning" which the current school system deems almost exclusively to subordinate positions.

Thus, within each context, the direct motivations and forms of action of the fundamentalist groups are different, even though the influences and inferences may be the same in different countries (in Egypt officials emphasize that the fundamentalists are receiving substantial financial assistance from Libya, from religious Saudi associations, and from Egyptian exiles, and that there are contacts between Egyptian fundamentalists and Iranian mullahs, etc.).

#### The Reinvasion of the Political Field

Actually, across the entire diversity of such situations, the essential feature is that the Islamic currents are trying to reinvade the political field in ways other than the promotion of a kind of bad religious conscience within the current Islamic societies, as was the case in previous decades. Moralizing discourses, frequently accompanied by conservative political attitudes, are ever more frequently linked to speeches on social disparities and the factual damages caused by the process of modernization experienced by these countries. The main topics have not varied so much. What have varied have been, rather, the possibilities for their "secularizing" as ideological and political levers and, therefore, their greater consistency with the differentiation which has taken place within the societies in question.

This differentiation which the Islamic treaties would like to take over may be illustrated by an interesting discussion published in the fundamentalist review AL-MUSLIM AL-MU'ASIR,<sup>9</sup> pitting the conservative fundamentalist Mustafa Kamal Wasfi against Muhammad Rida Murharram who identifies himself as a "leftist Moslem." He believes that faith is not synonymous with one or another position taken in political or social matters, whereas the former believe that a division of Moslems between leftists and

rightists would result in a "discord on the level of faith and fundamental differences on the practical level, threatening the foundations of Islam." Rida Muharram believes that this point of view would make secret a state of things inherited from past circumstances, whereas the shape of government, of the people, and of their social systems stem from human practice (with all its contingencies) rather than from a preexisting historical model which would be considered imperative and invariable, Islam having, above all, formulated general principles (such as the imamate, the Shura, etc.), which do not impose any limits in terms of ways and means of their application. A "distinction should be made between religion and ideology," for whereas "the essence of faith is the state of being one," "the essence of the Shari'ah is justice," i.e., that the domain of religion (in this case, in terms of faith) implies the consensus of all Moslems, whereas the area covered by the Shari'ah (the Law) is that of social practice and that the imperative of justice implies specific applications within specific contexts, where divergencies may exist between various interests, as expressed by the existence and differences of various ideologies within the community.

It is within this framework that he places the ideologies based on religion (or Islamic movements), identifying himself with the "Islamic left" which is "distinct from the other leftist currents . . . it is based, above all, on religion. . . and implies a constant course to religious criteria in order to determine the validity of collective action" within society. While emphasizing an opening to the modern age, and features shared with secular socialist ideology, the author, nevertheless, refers to Sayyid Qutb, one of the philosophers of the Moslem Brotherhood, who, in a work entitled "The Battle Between Islam and Capitalism," wrote that it was legitimate to engage in expropriations, providing that the social interest would require it, and even if the property thus affected had been acquired in a manner considered legitimate by religion,<sup>10</sup> since the collective interest has priority over that of the individuals.

We can see, therefore, the diversity of contexts and direct political motivations revealing the renewed outbreak of Islamic movements and the diversification of discourses which, as in the example we cited, occasionally even tried to invade an area occupied by the more secular ideologies.

Is this ferment something coming from the deep? Is it a question of a mutation or merely an expression of a confusion without clear prospects?

The factual development of the facts alone would enable us to determine the precise nature of such phenomena. We could only try to identify the factors which seem to play a major role within it.

## The Context of Domination

There is, first of all, a general context of external domination whose forms, even though changed since the colonial era, are no less burdensome. Domination relations are resented by the ever broader sectors within society as being at the origin of the distortions and imbalances from which they suffer. At a time when the local bourgeoisie itself has reached the point of denouncing an inequitable international economic order and are pressing against the indifference of their interlocutors of the industrialized north, this domination is becoming more and more intolerable and the anti-imperialist nationalisms (as illustrated by the case of Iran) are becoming only more exacerbated.

Yet, largely corresponding to such domination relations are both the type of modernization and the nature of the postcolonial states. The result was an acceleration of the alienation of a growing percentage of the peasantry and the urban middle classes (with the swelling of urban and suburban agglomerations), deprived of the old traditional balances, affected by the attraction of the new needs developed through exchanges with the north, confined within endless demands made of the state which has become the main purveyor of resources of all kinds, and more and more stricken by disparities in income, ways of life, and cultural models. The inability of the "modern" state to extend the promised benefits to such strata hurled the latter, to an ever greater extent, to the margin of the body social (which is revealed, for example, by the problems related to education and the unemployment of intellectuals which mainly affects such strata and which fails expectations nourished by explicit or implicit promises made by the postcolonial state). The process of class division was paralleled by a division among cultural models (consumption in particular), considering the inability of the new bourgeoisie (whether belonging to the private sector or the state) to propose a model for social and cultural integration which would be coherent and specific to that society at large.

The more the new system, affected by relations of foreign domination, emphasizes this polarization, the more the privileged strata appear to be extraneous and different from the rest of society. The problem of social disparities is not formulated in terms of inequality within a totality which is otherwise integrated (as in Japan, for example), but in terms of the legitimacy of the social structure itself, where domination relations are stronger than compensation and regulation factors (social, cultural, etc.). Within such a context modernism seems merely to reinforce such domination relations which benefit some minorities, rather than broaden the possibilities for access to greater prosperity for the bulk of the population. Consequently, abusive privileges and cultural rape are identified with this practice of modernism which consists of importing consumer and technological goods which either ineffectual or accelerate

the breakdown of the old structures (with the exodus and confusion which this implies) without creating new viable structures, for the infrequent progress achieved is unable to compensate for the developed imbalance.

Resorting to Islam, whether or not it turns to topics of liberal, reformist, or revolutionary ideology, seems to correspond also to this need to reject the type of legitimacy which this modernism seems to be the only one to confer within the state and society, in the name of the imperatives of development, the age, progress, etc.

Such a recourse is largely owed to the questioning of institutions bought from the Western democracies and which, in the various Moslem countries, have appeared to be more like a modern warning against the perpetuation of the domination than a compensation for the disappearance of the traditional representative aspects of precolonial society in the face of the authorities. Left without any real content, they have been, therefore, identified with a sort of legacy of the foreign domination, suspected of perversion to the extent to which, deprived of roots, there is no obligation to refer to Western democracy (hence, for example, the rejection of any reference even to the word "democracy" by Khomeyni who has come to consider it as non-Islamic. Excessive though it might be, this is a reaction to the Shah's parliamentarianism).

Hence the recourse to the imperative ethical antidote of Islam, considered the only legitimizing power and, therefore, denying to any modern system the right to assume full power and impose its supremacy without having to submit to the control of the community.

We clearly see that in practice nothing would prevent the reference to Islam to fall into arbitrariness. What matters here is to see in societies where the Western democratic model has not been accepted and has remained on the surface, the invocation of Islam as the factor which legitimizes and controls the power.

It is from such a viewpoint that we must reassess the ritual condemnation of "materialism," considered an essential evil bequeathed by the industrialized world.

Hence the constant reference to the Ummah, to the community which has been given priority for the sake of disqualifying a social process consisting of disparities and heterogeneities.

The intent is to institute a supreme control over such a process, that of the imperatives of the Islamic Ummah, considered as a norm of justice and a requirement of solidarity in the face of the law of generalized selfishness and subsequent splintering.



## Identity Assertion

It is thus that the call for the assertion of an identity opposing current Westernization contains the hope for a greater social justice, for the same norms would be applied to all. What practical ideal could this imply? Would it be an equalitarian patriarchal system (such as the one apparently desired by Khomeyni)? Would it be a society of middle distribution strata where traditionalism and reformism would harmonize? Or else, more profoundly, would it be a preliminary study of history by the broad masses, a history in which they have been deprived of the right to speak ever since the traditional defensive structures which ensured a balance between them and the precolonial powers were eliminated, something which, therefore, would perhaps open the way to the reformulation of all the questions asked through and of modernism in the Third World in a more creative perspective?

It is true that the establishment of one or another social model cannot be discussed before the combination of a great variety of factors which could make it possible has been ensured. That is why it would be difficult here to determine what the Utopias cited by the Islamic movements could contribute, in the positive sense, to factual social processes. Within a specific context, would they create situations which would favor more equalitarian systems or bourgeoisies better integrated with their society (consider the emphasis on "legitimate prophets" prescribed by the Shari'ah)? Would they favor a greater assertion of a secular society facing the state or, conversely, would they grant the state an even greater omnipotence?

At this point, we must take into consideration that going beyond the emphasis on a revaluation of tradition and the community--topics whose aims and immediate contents vary according to the political or sociological contexts within which they operate--one can clearly see the still unresolved problem of inserting a living identity inside contemporary history.

The perspective of the 21st century already poses this problem to the Moslem world and, more generally, to the Third World, in frightening terms.

Could it be that this perspective pertains to a qualitatively new stage in the struggle waged by the Third World against imperialism, aimed at establishing less inequitable international relations? It may also be a redefinition of a social and cultural model, bearing in mind the obvious limits to any type of growth in an underdeveloped country (taking into consideration economic, democratic, and ecological data) at a time when the Western model of industrial and social development is being more and more questioned.

The merging of these two perspectives favors the birth of phenomena such as the ferment of the Islamic movement today in which the exultation of anti-imperialist nationalism and the need for radically different social and cultural norms come together in a more or less confused way (in this connection consider the emphasis put on basic population needs, austerity, and the imperatives of a communal identity). It is true that neither of the subsequent forms nor the specific consequent practices could be determined from this ferment. It remains, above all, a major sign of the current evolution.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR 3 December 1979.
2. LE MONDE 23 November 1979.
3. According to al-Qadhdhafi, the Sunnah (the Prophet's Hadiths and Sira) contains conflicting elements and cannot be considered entirely authentic, since after the split between Ali's and Mu'awiyah's supporters each clan invented its Hadiths. Let us point out here that this is the first time that the chief of state of a Sunni country has dared to formulate such a claim against the Sunnah. Not even Ataturk or Bourguiba had dared to do so (see "The Evolution of Libyan institutions," Cresm, 1979).
4. Strangely, the monthly journal of the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood AL-DA'WAH (openly sold in Morocco) carried in its December 1979 issue a very critical article on Saudi Arabia, criticizing the deviations noted in customs, and the media, television in particular, and in education, questioning the "extreme and blind luxury." [not shown in the text]
5. Op. cit.
6. See MAGHREB-MACHREK, No 85, July-September 1979.
7. See LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, October 1979.
8. LE MONDE, 7 December 1979.
9. AL-MUSLIM AL-MU'ASIR, Kuwait, February-March 1979.
10. Ibid., pp 134-135

11. The events in Iran and the swell of anti-American hostility revealed the aggravation of this struggle which is also expressed by the increased fear of the Third World, within the Western world, which explains the nervousness, frequently marked by racism (which is a good manifestation of the arrogance of the rich), as seen in a number of Western press organs.

5157

CSO: 4400

## AFGHANISTAN

### FREEDOM FIGHTERS TO BE CRUSHED BY REINFORCED AFGHAN AIR POWER

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 12 Jan 80 p 4

[Text] Quetta, Jan. 11: There has been three-fold reported increase in the air power of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union to crush the nationalistic feelings and freedomfighters.

This was stated by travellers from Afghanistan at their interviews with Quetta pressmen at Chaman, a tiny Pak-Afghan border town and a nerve centre for Afghan international trade and traffic.

These travellers told newsmen that there had been guerrilla upsurge by religious forces opposed to secularism in Afghanistan. They said Muslim guerrillas were fighting the foreign combat troops and the Afghan Government forces to maintain religious sanctity and the sovereignty of their country.

They further informed the newsmen that the Muslim guerrillas, with whatever weapons available to them, were bravely fighting the foreign forces in the rural and tribal areas of Afghanistan.

They disclosed that the freedom-fighters had forced foreign operational forces to confine themselves to cities and towns as they had mostly blocked roads and bridges, besides cutting off telecommunication system in major parts of Afghanistan. They said that the foreign troops had to move under escort from their cantonments to their places of postings at key installations, including airports.

According to them, about 40 percent of the Afghan Armed Forces had been disbanded after necessary screening. The remaining 60 percent had also been disarmed and stripped of their military duties.

The travellers further disclosed that almost the entire Afghan Air Force was now being manned by foreign pilots after execution of 35 Afghan pilots.

Disarmed Afghan Army officers and Jawans were reported to have joined the nationalist forces to broaden their base against the Afghan regime, they said, adding that at present the Kabul regime was not popular because of basic ideological differences.

The travellers further told newsmen that besides purging of the Afghan Army and Air Force, Governors and senior civil officers had also been sacked. Most of them had been arrested.

They disclosed that foreign troops had flown in 75 more warplanes and 21 helicopters for action against the Afghan nationalists. Some cases of strafing had also been reported from interior of Kabul and Kandhar provinces. About 4,000 Afghans in Kabul and Kandhar provinces alone had perished.

The travellers added that foreign troops were using transport planes for their movement as cases of sniping over their military convoys by the freedom-fighters were on the increase. Searchlights at key installations, including airports, had been installed by the occupation forces to curb night attacks by the freedom-fighters.

According to some traders from Afghanistan, there has been flight of capital from Afghanistan on account of unstable situation there.

Afghan economy, they said had been shattered. Besides all trade and commerce had come to a standstill.

CSO: 4420



## STUDENT UNION ELECTIONS HELD AT 11 UNIVERSITIES

### Close of Nominations

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 26 Nov 79 p 7

[Text] Nominations in the elections of student unions at universities closed yesterday. There were 1,408 candidates, including 151 women.

Dr Sabhi 'Abd al-Hakim, vice president of Cairo University for student and educational affairs, announced that the new student union elections are taking place in the context of a new family life, with total impartiality and honesty.

He said that every student is guaranteed campaign publicity within limits which are consistent with the respect due the sanctity of the university and institutes of learning, in order that this campaign publicity not disrupt regular studies or the conduct of lectures.

He added that a committee is being formed today to examine nomination applications at every college, as a preliminary step toward announcing the lists of students who meet the conditions for candidacy with respect both to their distinction in social and academic activities in previous years in their class and in the activity in which they are candidates.

Yesterday was the deadline for nomination applications, and 1,408 students, including 151 women, came forward as candidates. Male students were more interested in the travel, public service, technical, cultural and sports committees. Female students were more interested in the trips and social committees.

He added that only 5 percent of the student candidates were female. In the School of Commerce there were 97 male candidates and 67 female. In agriculture there were 121 male candidates and only 10 female. In the sciences there were 132 male candidates and 16 female. In veterinary medicine there were 114 male candidates and 12 female. In economics and political science there were 57 male candidates and 18 female. In information there were 48 candidates, of whom only one was female. At the College

of Sciences [Dar al-'Ulum] for all 3 years there were 88 male candidates and also one female. In medicine there were 156 male candidates and 2 female. In literature there were 45 male candidates and 14 female. In law there were 109 male candidates and only 3 female. In antiquities there were 38 male candidates and 14 female. In pharmacology there were 87 male candidates and 2 female. In dentistry there were 43 male candidates and 2 female. At the Natural Treatment Institute there was no woman among the 34 candidates. At the Nursing Institute the number of candidates did not reach the required minimum of 40 for the 4 years. The students Imam Fayiz Hasan and Halah Faraj Isma'il were awarded places on the travel and public service committees.

#### Calm Atmosphere Surrounding Elections

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 30 Nov 79 p 5

[Text] Yesterday 400,000 students in 11 universities and higher institutes went to the ballot boxes to choose members of sports [sic] unions. Al-Azhar University has decided to hold its elections on 4 December. The elections yesterday were marked by intense competition among the students. A number of students in some colleges won by popular acclaim. Results will be announced this morning.

Yesterday each college chose 40 students for membership in committees of the Union of Colleges, the equivalent of 10 students from every class. There will be elections among the winners next Monday to select 10 members of the Union Council. On 4 December the secretary of the Union Council will be elected, and he will be a member of the Activities Coordinating Council.

At Cairo University the start of the elections in the schools of commerce, economics, political science, law, literature, engineering, agriculture and information was delayed nearly one-half hour because of rain. This has resulted in re-elections tomorrow in some classes where the required minimum of 50 percent of the students enrolled and registered in the school was not met. At Cairo University there were 1,068 candidates in 19 colleges competing for 760 places on 5 activities committees including social, trips, families, travel, public service, cultural, technical and sports. Among the 1,068 students were 151 women, of whom 29 won by popular acclaim. Among the male students, 132 won by popular acclaim in the activities of travel, trips and families. At the same time, there was intense competition for the cultural, technical and sports activities committees.

Dr Sabhi 'Abd al-Hakim, vice president of Cairo University for student and educational affairs, reviewed the election process and described it as the first elections to be held within the general context of a family spirit.

## Campaigning Is Calm

At 'Ayn Shams University elections were held in nine colleges. There were no elections in the girls' college, because all the candidates won by popular acclaim.

Zakariya al-'Arif, supervisor of youth at the university and head of youth offices in the colleges, inspected the election committees and reviewed the conduct of the elections. He stated that they were carried out peacefully and that the students, both candidates and voters, were bound by the consciousness and seriousness imposed upon them by their national and social traditions.

Zakariya al-'Arif said that the sorting committees began work after 1700 hours to examine and sort the ballots and announce the results. Re-elections will be held Saturday for those committees which did not obtain 50 percent of the votes.

## Hilwan University

Competition was intense among candidates in the colleges of Hilwan University. At the Girls' Physical Education College in al-Jazirah results were announced for the first and second year classes. Students in the fourth year won by popular acclaim. Elections for the third-year students were postponed until next Saturday, because the legal minimum number of votes was not met. Election results were as follows:

In the first year in the sports committee were Ibtisam Muhammad 'Izz al-Din and Nashwa al-Sayid 'Ali Salam. In the social committee were Aminah Sayid and Halah Harun. In the cultural committee were Aminah Zaki and Wafa' Hilal. In the travel committee were Halah Muhammad and Iman Rajib. In the families committee were Iman 'Abd al-Hamid and Halah Zaki.

In the second year were Muhammad Muhammad, 'Ablah 'Adil, Zaynib Muhammad, Susan 'Ali, Aminah Yusuf, Iman 'Abd al-Raziq, Ahlam 'Abd al-Hadi, Aminah Ibrahim, Shahinaz Ibrahim and 'Aydah 'Abd al-Mun'im.

In the fourth year were Sana' Muhammad, Muna Ibrahim, Fatin Labibi, Majidah Ahmad Tumman, Jamal Hashim, Thuna' Salih, Najwa Ahmad, Nufisah Muhammad, Mirfat Ibrahim, and Fatimah Mahmud.

In the School of Commerce and Business Administration there was keen competition among 94 male students and only two female students, and increased numbers of students came to the committees to vote.

In the Applied Arts College candidates used "drums and pipes" in campaigning for their colleagues who were candidates. Election results in the colleges will be announced one by one beginning today.

## Asyut University

At Asyut University the elections were marked by total calm. The students began coming to the committees early in the morning. The colleges were empty of campaign posters. University President Dr Hasan Hamdi, Dr 'Abd al-Raziq Hasan and Dr Basri Hamid inspected the committees in the colleges.

Yesterday student union elections were held in six colleges of the al-Zaqaziq University, including veterinary medicine, medicine, agriculture, commerce, education and law.

Union members won by popular acclaim in the colleges of science, engineering, pharmacology and literature. The elections took place in the six colleges in complete calm, and there was a strong drawing at the ballot boxes.

More than 60 percent of the committees in the six colleges won by popular acclaim. The results of the remaining committees will be announced immediately after the sorting process.

## Al-Mansurah University

At al-Mansurah yesterday more than 33,000 students in the various colleges of al-Mansurah University chose members of the student unions. There were nearly 400 candidates in these elections, and 150 of them won by popular acclaim. A decrease was noted in the number of female candidates. Dr Ibrahim Muhammad Mahdi, youth leader in the College of Commerce, said that 93 students were candidates. In education there were 101 candidates, and no committee won by popular acclaim, as was the case in the College of Engineering. In the College of Agriculture there were 57 candidates, and the sports committee in the first and third years won by popular acclaim. In the College of Medicine there were 114 candidates, including two women.

Elections in the Higher Institute of Cooperation and Administration Studies are scheduled to be held tomorrow, Saturday.

## New Ordinance in Effect

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 1 Dec 79 p 9

[Text] The second phase of student union elections begins today in 11 Egyptian universities in the divisions where the minimum of 50 percent of the students enrolled and registered in the college was not met.

The first phase of the committee elections was completed the day before yesterday within the ranks of each college of the university on the basis of the new student ordinance which requires that a university professor visit the union committees.

On Monday, the day after tomorrow, elections of the secretaries of committees in each college will begin. On Tuesday there will be elections of the secretary of the Union Council of the college. The elections will result in the creation of a Student Union Council of the college or institute. It has been decided that the dean of the college is to be added to the composition of this council, along with the various committee heads, the chairman of the technical organ of Youth Protection in the college, and the secretaries of student union committees. The council elects a secretary from among its student members.

In every university this week a decision is being issued with regard to the appointment of union leaders on the college level as well as representatives of professors and workers in Youth Protection in order for the new unions to begin pursuing their activities by the end of this week.

It has also been decided for the first time this year that a student activity coordinating council be created in every university under the chairmanship of the university's vice president for education and student affairs, with the membership of the college Union Council leaders, chairman of the technical organ of the Youth Protection of the university, heads of units concerned with the activity of the council, and secretaries of the Union Councils in colleges and institutes. This council will be responsible for organizing sports, artistic, literary and scouting contests and for forming teams to represent the university.

7811

CSO: 4802



# KURDISH TRIBES, LEADERS, PARTIES PLOT COURSE

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 17-23 Dec 79 pp 35-38

[Article by 'Isam Muhammad: "Kordestan, Stronghold of Opposition to Khomeyni"]

[Excerpts] Recent battles in Iranian Kordestan have catapulted the Kurdish national problem into the arena of events and headlines once again. People everywhere are talking about "Ezaeldin Alhosseyni and Qasemlu, the Kurdish Democratic Party [KDP], the Kurds in other countries, and a general Kurdish movement--especially as the latest American-Iranian confrontation continues, during which the position of the Kurds will have a big effect on the situation in Iran.

Perhaps it would be beneficial at this point for us to shed some light on the Kurdish problem in Iran and draw a map of the political forces and personalities which have played and continue to play a role in this problem. This may help establish a better foundation for an understanding of the current struggle between the Kurdish leaders and the Iranian Government.

'Abdolrahman Qasemlu

[During the 1960's], Qasemlu lived in Czechoslovakia. The fact that he was a former member of the Tudeh Party helped make this possible. There he completed his studies in economics, and his dissertation on the economy of Kordestan is considered one of the best reference sources on the economy and society of Kordestan (it has been published in Kurdish, French, Arabic and English). However, Qasemlu was subjected to some harassment and was forced to leave Czechoslovakia because of his support for Dubcek. His Czech wife was one of the main individuals in Dubcek's movement, which was neutralized in Czechoslovakia in the wake of the "Prague Spring" of 1968.

In the early 1970's, Qasemlu began to reorganize the KDP abroad, having become the party's secretary general. Qasemlu lived with other party officials in Iraq where he published the newspaper KORDESTAN and worked as an economic consultant for the Iraqi Planning Ministry. After 1975, he traveled between the East European states and Paris before returning to Iran on the eve of the shah's downfall.

## After the Fall of the Shah

With the flowing of the popular tide which accompanied the uprisings of the Iranian people, political consciousness was raised in Iranian Kordestan as well. Demonstrations and violent clashes with the shah's forces occurred in Kurdish cities shortly before the victory of the revolution. In the last days of Shahpur Bakhtiar's government, the people in the Kurdish areas seized weapons from the government guard posts and some army barracks, and thus tens of thousands of the area's inhabitants became armed overnight. A situation arose which was unlike any ever witnessed in Iranian Kordestan, even in the days of the Mahabad Republic. The Kurds formed their own revolutionary committees and attempted from the beginning to give these committees and their region an independent character. When a group of Khomeyni supporters and individuals connected with the central authorities attempted to form revolutionary committees, they clashed with the Kurdish revolutionary committees which saw their action as interference in the affairs of the area.

A popular conference was held in Mahabad and presented the area's demands, embodied in eight points, to the government. These demands included local self-government for the Kurdish area and a stipulation that all administrative officials be Kurds and residents of the area, and called for the formation of an army, revolutionary guard forces and a local police force made up entirely of Kurds.

The ensuing story of delegations and promises between the Kurds and the central authorities and the struggle which was sometimes hidden and sometimes open is well known. The important fact is that the Kurdish area remained practically semi-independent, and many government orders and instructions were not put into effect there. In the end, this caused the situation to explode when the government initiated its policy calling for an end to the "chaos" and a strengthening of the government's grip on the affairs of the country.

What are the political and military forces which are active in Iranian Kordestan? What are the relationships among them and where are their centers of influence?

--KDP: This is the biggest organized force in Iranian Kordestan. The strength of its influence is not attributable to the influence of its leaders or mass support for its platform, but to the fact that it is an outgrowth of the old Kurdish Democratic Party and the Mahabad Republic.

The KDP's power is concentrated in Mahabad, Saqqez, Bowkan, Naqadeh and Reza'iyeh, i.e., in the central portion of Iranian Kordestan. It also has organizations in Teheran and other cities where Kurds live. Most of the party's strength is in the cities among businessmen, the petite bourgeoisie, the educated and the clergy, while the party remains weak among the peasants. However, the KDP has recently concluded tribal alliances, and some feudalists and tribal leaders have begun to cooperate with it.

The main leaders of the KDP are 'Abdolrahman Qasemlu; Ghani Baluriyan who has come out of the shah's prison after 20 years; Karim Hassami, who is known for his links with the Soviets and is a former director of the Kurdish section of the secret radio station whose broadcasts were aimed at Iran from East Germany; Mohammad Amin Saraji, translator of the COMMUNIST MANIFESTO into Kurdish; Hayman Mahabadi, the famous Kurdish poet, and Molla 'Abdollah Hasan, a clergyman and a long-time party leader.

Prior to recent events, struggles rocked the party as it prepared to hold its general congress. Qasemlu's status with the party base was weak, and there was a strong trend among the party base and the masses to favor Ghani Baluriyan for the leadership of the party. Meanwhile, the Tudeh Party was trying to use its influence to make Karim Hassami the KDP's secretary general.

--Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kordestan: This organization is an outgrowth of the revolutionary wing of the KDP. It broke away from the KDP in 1967 under the leadership of Sharif Zadeh, Molla Avareh and Soleyman Mo'eyni. The nucleus of this organization was Marxist, and it was formed in the course of recent years in response to the shah's regime. It was opposed to the Soviet Union and was influenced by the thought of Mao Zedong and the Chinese experience.

This organization expanded after the fall of the shah, and educated Marxists returning from Europe and America joined its ranks. The organization works through various mass fronts, the most important of which are the Peasant Associations which took part in the formation of the organization in order to work against the feudalists, who have regathered their forces and organized armed bands during the current state of disorder.

The organization's strength is concentrated in the areas of Marivan, Pavel and Sanandaj, i.e., in the southern part of Iranian Kordestan. However, it has some strength in the other areas. The organization relies primarily on the peasants, the educated and the poor in the cities. The struggle between the organization and the leadership of the KDP was fierce. The organization accused the KDP of embracing and supporting the feudalists, and charged that the KDP leadership was linked with big foreign powers and area states.

The Tribes: Some of the tribes have their own armed forces and have played a major role in recent events. Kordestan is characterized by the comparatively strong influence of its feudalists and tribal leaders relative to other areas. The shah's policy was to avoid provoking these individuals, even during the period of agricultural reform. Moreover, industrialization and the expansion of cities are extremely weak in Kordestan, a fact which has kept tribal and feudal ties strong in comparison to the other areas of Iran.

The biggest of the armed tribes at present is the Shakak tribe, which lives near the Iraqi and Turkish borders. This tribe was behind the battles which took place near the Turkish border and the kidnaping incident involving

railroad workers. They took control of a border station and collected customs duties and fees. The tribe's armed force is estimated at 20,000 men. It cooperates with the KDP, and actually assisted them in the Naghadeh battles.

There are numerous tribal forces and local leaders in other areas, and all of them work to the advantage of the national movement of opposition to the government and cooperate in one way or another with the KDP.

--Other organized forces: There are other political organizations which are smaller in size and influence and restrict their activities to cities or specific areas rather than operating in Kordestan as a whole. Two such organizations are the Association of Defenders of the Rights of the Kurdish People, which held its organizational meeting in the city of Marivan, and the Federation of Farmers and Peasants Associations, which enjoys a certain amount of independence in spite of the influence of the Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kordestan within it.

--Iranian organizations active in Kordestan: The Organization of the Iranian People's Fedayeen have a branch in Kordestan and armed headquarters in most of the cities. The Organization of People's Mojahedin and the Organization for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class also have branches and organizations in Kordestan. Most of these forces cooperate with the Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kordestan, but the Fedayeen and the Mojahedin also maintain cooperative relations with the KDP, despite their charge that the KDP leadership has allowed itself to be influenced by the Tudeh Party and its policies.

--Sheykh 'Ezaeldin Alhosseyni: Sheykh Alhosseyni is an independent clergyman who is a former imam of the principal mosque in the city of Mahabad. He has leftist and socialist views, and enjoys widespread influence in Kordestan. Because of the conflict between the KDP and the other forces, Sheykh 'Ezaeldin Alhosseyni was agreed on as a compromise and became chairman of the revolutionary committees in Kordestan. In his thinking and positions, Sheykh Alhosseyni is closest to the Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kordestan. The KDP, on the other hand, has recently tried to weaken his position. When Sheykh Alhosseyni returned from Teheran after his meeting with Khomeyni and other officials last May, the KDP attempted to prevent the people from organizing a lavish reception for him, but this attempt failed.

It is Alhosseyni's political activity rather than his religious position which has secured such widespread popularity for him. He does not hide his belief in the need for the secularization of Iran and the separation of religion from politics, and he has made statements concerning his social and political views which are inappropriate for a clergyman. He told the Iranian newspaper ETTELA'AT: "Even if Gabriel came down from heaven and told us to give up our demand for self-government, we would not do it!"

In addition to Sheykh Alhosseyni there is Moftizadeh, a clergyman from Sanandaj known for his loyalty to Khomeyni. Moftizadeh attempted to form revolutionary committees in his area which were linked to the leadership



of the Iranian revolution. His influence is confined to Sanandaj and its surrounding areas and Kermanshah where the Shi'ite Kurds live. A majority of the Kurds belong to the Sunni denomination.

--Position of the Barzani group: The press has published numerous and often conflicting reports about the activities of Barzani's sons and their party, as well as Jalal Talebani's role in bringing about the situation in Iran's Kordestan and his responsibility for the occupation of the military barracks.

The Barzani group has hundreds of armed men in Iranian Kordestan. These forces are located in two areas: near Marivan and Paveh, where the group is taking advantage of its good historical relations with Moftizadeh; and in the northern part of Iranian Kordestan through the agency of the Shakak and other tribes. The group does not have any influence in the cities and central areas which constitute the centers of influence of the Kurdish political organizations. Most of the Kurdish organizations are hostile to the Barzani group, particularly the Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kordestan and Sheykh 'Ezaeldin Alhosseyni. One of the eight points in the list of demands of the Kurdish Popular Conference called for a cutoff of aid to the Barzani party leadership.

However, Qasemlu has recently begun to build a cooperative relationship with this group, despite the fact that this move is encountering opposition from his party base due to Barzani's history of cooperation with the shah and his role in the arrest and assassination of leaders of the Kurdish movement in Iran.

On the other hand, the Kordestan National Union led by Talebani has a strong relationship with the Organization of the Toilers of Kordestan and Sheykh Alhosseyni. However, its relationship with Qasemlu began to deteriorate after Qasemlu encouraged a split within the National Union last March.

The National Union's position fluctuates between aiding the Kurdish and Iranian political organizations and attempting to gain a rearguard Iranian base of support for its activities in Iraq on the one hand, and public support for Khomeyni and the Iranian revolution on the other.

All the forces which oppose the Iranian revolution have found their opportunity in the Kurdish problem. Disregarding the Iranian charges concerning the presence of former generals of the shah's army and foreign agents in Kordestan, opponents of Khomeyni are betting on the Kurdish card to weaken the Iranian regime and force it to accept their conditions. The Organization of the People's Fedayeen, the Mojahedin, the Trotskyites and all the extreme left-wing organizations are active in Kordestan and are carrying the banner of defense of the rights of their people. After resigning from the Foreign Ministry and switching to the opposition, Karim Sanjabi began to remember his Kurdish origin, put out feelers toward Kermanshah and other Kurdish areas and cooperated with Kurdish leaders.

Meanwhile, the Kurdish forces that had always considered Ayatollah Shari'atmadari a representative of "the Islamic right which bargained with the shah's regime" have now shifted over to cooperating with the ayatollah, asking for his



help and accepting his peaceful proposals. In turn, Shari'atmadari is using his Kurdish relations as an important pressure card in his struggle with Khomeyni's leadership.

Thus a new situation has developed in which Kordestan has become not just the focus of a demand for self-government but a stronghold of the opposition in all its forms and directions.

Will forces emerge which go against the tide?

No organized Kurdish forces have yet emerged which are working toward upholding the unity of the Iranian revolution, but such an inclination undoubtedly exists among the spontaneous masses. The direction taken by Moftizadeh, which is confined to a specific area, cannot affect the balance of forces in favor of the central authorities. The ceasefire agreement which the Mahabad Municipal Council delegation signed with the government could possibly be the beginning of a Kurdish position dissociated from Qasemlu. Even if the delegation fails to control the situation in Kordestan and bring an end to the fighting, its difference of opinion with Qasemlu and its disagreement with his stubborn position will open up new horizons for the Kurdish movement, which will not be able to uphold the unity of its forces and maintain its conflicting directions for very long.

Also worth mentioning is the fact that the head of the Kurdish delegation which signed the agreement with the government in Teheran was Dr Rahim Qazi, nephew of the Kurdish leader Alqazi Mohammad and a well-known Kurdish author and man of culture. Rahim Qazi wrote the first long Kurdish novel, entitled "The Peshmerga," or "The Fada'i." Qazi was the first to use the term "Peshmerga" in Kurdish literature, and the word subsequently became widespread and popular and was applied to Kurdish fighters in all the armed movements.

Rahim Qazi lived in the Soviet Union following the collapse of the Republic of Mahabad, and recently returned to fill an important role in Mahabad.

Will the originator of the word "Peshmerga" in literature be the first person to oppose Qasemlu and halt the fighting of his Peshmerga? Coming days will answer this question, and the majority opinion is that there will not be too long to wait. The Kurdish situation is advancing toward some kind of split, and perhaps it is only the fighting which is now delaying such a split and upholding the position of the Kurdish leaders.

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CSO: 4902

## EDITORIALS ASSESS FINANCE MINISTER'S ECONOMIC PLAN

## Positive Aspects Stressed

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 19 Nov 79 p 2

[Text] We find it difficult to determine whether to commend the celerity revealed by the new finance minister, Mr Yiga'el Hurvitz, in that he succeeded in a relatively short time in crystallizing an economic plan to the point of presenting it to the government. Even if the lamps in the Finance Ministry were burning all night it can still be considered a lightning stroke. Or perhaps the plan is a hasty job that requires tenderness to enable it to stand on its own feet and not to bow out like so many other plans that brought no healing to the Israeli economy.

After this reservation we will proceed to assess the general provisions of the plan, which became known yesterday. The first familiar sign in this plan is the attempt to grapple with many sectors at one and the same time. The common element is the pronounced trend to put an end to the fool's paradise where the government presented gifts to every outstretched hand, with no discrimination and always with generosity. The government granted development loans with an open hand; e.g.: with no linkage to a low rate of interest and terms of repayment that made every investment profitable. In sharp contrast, the government obligated itself to repay with linkage all who agreed to lend it money for these development loans. As a result the government debt climbed to dizzying heights.

The government, and not only this last one, very generously granted benefits to every sector. I doubt whether anybody ever kept an account. The budgets of the various government offices climbed steadily. We are understating the case when we claim that these expenditures were not always necessary. We doubt that many of these expenses were vitally needed in the government's budget. Had they been omitted the government could still have gotten along and not a hair of a single citizen would have fallen to the ground.

Trimming the development budget, it is true, will result in an economic slowdown and perhaps even a recession. But, is there any escape from a recession if we wish to gain a measure of stability in this feverish economy? At times

a slowdown may be followed by an expansion, a renewal of economic growth. A slowdown in the rate was too high. We still have to realize the industrial potential and develop manufacturing means by increasing the manpower in the manufacturing sector. Workers can be transferred from employment in the service industries to jobs in the manufacturing sector.

From this viewpoint Mr Hurvitz's plan has a positive aspect inasmuch as it will tend to stimulate a flow of manpower to the manufacturing branches. It is positive also in that it will provide means to stimulate manufacturing and to decrease imports. This import decrease will add encouragement to local manufacturing, which very often can compete with the imported products. The tendency to buy only imported products is a sign of the society turning bourgeois and continuously striving to raise the standard of living.

Perhaps it is too early to praise or fault the economic plan. We have already become accustomed to a succession of new economic plans whose implementation has led to disappointment. Not because they were inherently defective. The failure came in the implementation. The plan has not yet received wide publicity, and already it is a subject for debate. One of the positive points in the plan should be pointed out: the recognition of the serious housing problem. It has been weighing heavily on our society and no efforts should be spared to arrive at a solution.

Even at this stage it is permissible to criticize the trend toward freezing the national insurance payments and other allotments. It is doubtful whether this attack on the living standards of a large portion of the citizenry (particularly those who are not in the high income bracket) has a potential for success. The government cannot withstand the pressures that will ensue. True, their means of protesting are not powerful, but it is a gross inequity to inflict a deep injury on this sector. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the economic plan will result in a reduction of the standard of living of individuals in the high income bracket. They are not dependent on cost of living increases or wage adjustments. It would have been wiser for Mr Hurvitz to reverse the order of priorities, as long as the high income bracket is not touched, as long as restraints are not placed on the exaggerated demands of privileged groups of workers and of members of the free professions. A plan that inflicts injury on the dependent of our society is doomed to failure. It is a situation the public will not tolerate.

As stated previously there are faults to be found in the plan. But, it should be noted that the new finance minister approached the economic problems with commendable alacrity. He is entitled to wide public support for his attempt to halt an inflation which is injurious from any aspect.

## Plan Attacked

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 21 Nov '79

[Text] The angry reply that greeted the publication of the finance minister's economic plan was to be expected and we may add was quite natural. When you inflict injury on a person he cries out instinctively. He does not ask why. The same applies when a doctor begins a surgical procedure causing pain to the patient. But an intelligent person asks himself, is this vital? Will the operation result in a cure for the person's ills? Is not the temporary pain to be preferred to a continuation of the disease?

Perhaps it is too early to talk of logic. The finance minister cut into the live flesh of the citizen in a startling manner. Judging from Mr Hurvitz's previous public expressions he intended to deliver an instantaneous blow and avoid creating any pleasant expectations. That was the reason for the cancellation of the subsidies in a single step. But it is difficult to refrain from feeling that the knife cut too deeply in the living flesh without peeling back the layer of fat, if we are to continue the surgical analogy.

We do not decry the necessity to restrain inflation, return stable values to the economy and to cool the present heated atmosphere. But the measures announced by the finance minister appear at present to resemble the pouring of oil on a fire. There is little in the steps proposed that will cool the inflation. On the contrary, it will add to it. We subscribe fully to Mr Hurvitz's biting remark, "Our wastefulness could easily support another state." We add our endorsement. Any number of states could have been built with the money wasted during the 31 years of the state's existence. These things are well-known and worrisome. But, mere statements and observations do not effect a cure.

At the moment, perhaps Mr Hurvitz has other plans in his bag. The greatest injury was to the lower classes. The indemnity is a mockery. Limitations on credit to industry aroused a sharp outcry from the industrialists. Fear pervades the atmosphere. The idea of absorbing service workers into the manufacturing sphere is not new. But so far nobody has been able to implement this idea. Credit limitations will result in unemployment and may shake the foundations of industry. We are not here to protect the well-to-do, but it is well to remember that industry supports hundreds of thousands of families. If they will be dropped from the rolls of industry what hope is there for the inclusion into manufacturing of thousands of workers who have been sentenced to dismissal by Mr Hurvitz? Everyone agrees that it is necessary to revitalize the public sector; to free it from the superfluous accretions that have gathered over the years. They know that the public structure is overloaded. It may be possible to sustain the economy and the services with half the number of employees engaged at present in government service, municipalities and social organizations

This is a goal whereby more than the 9 billion lira represented by the subsidies on vital food commodities can be saved. It would also have been possible to gradually lower the subsidies rather than removing them at one blow. But it seems that Mr Hurvitz was in a great hurry to achieve success in this goal that was thrust upon him and thereby committed an error; an error which it will be difficult to correct. Perhaps because he is loathe to have it said that he submitted to street demonstrations and to public pressure. We suppose he took into consideration the sharp public reaction and nevertheless decided to maintain his position. It should be noted that Mr Hurvitz received the unanimous support of the economic cabinet and of the representatives of the coalition in the Finance Committee. As a result, protests at this point would be ineffectual.

We must assume that Mr Hurvitz took into consideration the reaction of the Histadrut. He made no effort to hold prior discussions with employers or to reach an understanding. It is too early to guess what Mr Hurvitz's next steps will be and what the Histadrut's reply will be. Possibly if no effort is made for a rapprochement after the deed is committed matters may boil over into bitter struggles. The demonstrations yesterday of the 'Panthers' will not greatly influence the course of events. But there is a fear that if the Histadrut decides to bring the struggle out into the open we shall find ourselves in a perplexing situation with severe results.

What is required of the finance minister at this stage is that he not content himself with the measures adopted by the economic cabinet. Supplemental provisions are needed which will clearly demonstrate that there is a true sharing of the burden by all segments of the public; that the load that is being borne by the poorer classes is also being shouldered by other classes, and that the government is not just talking but actually plans to cut the budget. We are not happy at the prospect of hordes of discharged employees before provision is made for their absorption in industry. Tens of thousands of idle workers in the streets is an incendiary situation. In the meantime everything is enclosed in a deep fog. Mr Hurvitz's explanations are an attempt at persuasion, but the finance minister will not be judged by his speeches. Economic plans have preceded him, but there is not a trace left of them but the speeches. If Mr Hurvitz wishes to succeed he must demonstrate that the hurt is not confined to one class, that the hurt is unavoidable and that the operation will save the sick and feverish body of the economy. This he can achieve only by adopting significant supplemental measures.

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CSO: 4805



## CARTER'S MOVES AGAINST IRAN SAID TOO MODERATE

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 15 Nov 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Carter Flexes His Muscles"]

[Text] The continuation of the drama at the American Embassy in Teheran does not cease to absorb our interest. The question is not the Americans held captive by the students. We are not speaking about a piratical act perpetrated by persons unknown. The Iranian rulers gave their wholehearted support to the act. It appears that the support came not after the deed but was planned beforehand. We therefore cannot regard it as a spontaneous act of terror.

The incident must be regarded as something new in international diplomatic relations. Iran did not sever relations with the United States over the latter's refusal to hand over the exiled shah. It chose to do something much worse. It took the embassy employees hostage. This is a new style of political relations; not recognized anywhere in the world of international politics.

The three measures taken by Carter against Iran are not sufficient to deter the man in Teheran who is giving orders intelligible only to himself, and who is able to sway an irrational mob. The deportation of Iranian students from the United States is a policy bound to please the Ayatollah Khomeyni from an Islamic viewpoint. The banning of any purchases of Iranian oil by Americans preceded by only a few hours what had been anticipated from the beginning, viz, a break in supply by the Iranians. It is doubtful whether the last response, the seizure of Iranian capital in American banks, is sufficient to frighten the old Ayatollah. Some time ago he published directives describing Israeli money as impure and prohibiting any benefits derived from such money. Iran is not in need of money. To them \$5 billion is a piddling sum.

These responses are not sufficient to influence the hoped-for outcome. At this stage they are no more than a mere whisper. It is true the measures are a demonstration of muscle flexing, but they contain very little to deter

the venerable leader. The Americans are wrestling with vexing problems. A military action aimed at freeing the captives in the embassy does not appear practical. An attempt to conquer Iran may drag the Soviet Union into the arena. In the present situation of total anarchy that is pervading the international community there are many dangers that are difficult to assess.

In the meantime the American regime enjoys total support from all the political factions in the United States including the future competitors for the presidency. The regime will have to consider methods of putting an end to the new life-style in international politics introduced by Iran. If there is no adequate response this piratical behavior will become the new norm. The international community is hoping that the muscle flexing will be followed by more substantial action which will restore order in international politics.

It should be noted that the Arab terrorists are cooperating with the Khomeyni terrorists; they have official approval. The Arab group has already attacked other embassies and murdered ambassadors. This week the Israeli ambassador to Portugal was wounded. This happened just a few days after the PLO leader was received with great honor. This is an example of the corruption in the new political life-style. It must be stopped.

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## EDITORIAL CALLS FOR GUSH EMUNIM CONCESSIONS

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 19 Nov 79 p 2

[Text] The compromise suggested by the government in the matter of Elon Moreh was intended to conciliate the members of Gush Emunim on the one hand and to avoid a confrontation with the judicial establishment on the other. But at first glance it is doubtful whether it will solve even one of the many problems. The members of Gush Emunim will accept the judgment but it is doubtful whether the general opposition will see this as a way out. They will interpret this as acquiescence by one group. It will not decrease the militancy of other opposing groups.

It is doubtful whether the attempt to divide the decision into two parts will withstand a legal test. The differentiation into two types of land seems forced. Moreover, the government does not enter any objection to the judicial decision and is prepared to vacate portions of the territory not included in the complaint to the court. The government was constantly seeking an honorable retreat from the complications resulting from this legal incident. It was thrust into a political complication. Logically the settlers are entitled to assistance from the government in finding an honorable retreat from these complexities. In a large measure the government was responsible. The members of Gush Emunim demonstrate extreme inflexibility and thrust the government into a vexing situation.

The government cannot be blamed for indifference to the demands of settlement in the Judea and Samaria zones. Elon Moreh was established only through the help of the government. It did not initiate the evacuation from the locale because of political considerations. It did not retreat from a confrontation with the Arab world and with friendly countries on whose economic support Israel was dependent.

The Gush Emunim members should reconsider the government's situation and refrain from forcing a confrontation, though they may be convinced they are fighting for an important principle. There are times to concede and times to fight. It seems to us that this stage calls for concession. It will not weaken their position.

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## EDITORIAL CRITICIZES HANDLING OF SHECHEM MUNICIPALITY LEADER

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 15 Nov 79 p 2

[Text] The Council of Ministers, which decided to continue the process of exiling the leader of the Shechem Municipality, Basam Shakah, certainly pondered on the subject in all its aspects. It was aware of its impact on the range of relations with the local authorities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The session took place after a meeting with the leaders of the municipalities, including Gaza. The threat of resignations hung in the air. Members of the government knew that the leaders took exception to the explicit expressions delivered by the leader of the municipality. He claimed he was not properly understood, and there are some who claim he was prepared to go further in a retraction and to clarify it through the Israeli communications media. He offered to apologize for a misunderstanding.

We do not have the facts that were before the Council and we therefore cannot fault it. However, this does not deprive us of the right to make some observations and to pose some questions. The decision that was reached was not accompanied by the required clarification, a clarification that was most exigent in an incident of this type. The decision to inflict the full measure of the law aroused surprise in the international community. What appears more serious to us is the fact that it is not fully understood by the Israeli public.

Among circles in the Department of Defense there are whispers that Basam Shakah overstepped the limits. But, his offenses were numerous even before this: his extremism, his provocations at every opportunity, and his bitter pronouncements against the government. On the other hand other considerations should have been weighed, such as the evidences of submission by the municipality leaders who came to beg for his safety. These were leaders who did not as a rule cooperate with the Israeli regime. Was Shakah's transgression so great that it could not be forgiven so that a plea for forgiveness and even a readiness to apologize could not save him?

It is not our intention to defend the man. His intense hatred got the better of his good sense. Basam Shakah has earned all the vilification leveled at him. Israel preferred exile to any other judicial punishment that could have

been inflicted by a court of justice. Shakah is not alone in his identification with the terroristic aims of the PLO. Most of the municipality leaders in the area believe as he does. But there are times when political wisdom dictates that the raised rod not be brought down on the head of the guilty. The impact may have a greater and deeper influence. Since the Six-Day War municipality leaders and senior religious figures have been exiled when guilty of incitement. Perhaps that is the reason we were enabled to pass peacefully through some difficult periods. Quite possibly the relative quiet prevailing on the West Bank these past years is a result of the policy of exile and the destruction of dwellings. That is indeed alarming.

This time there is an opportunity to weigh the gain against the loss. The mass resignations of the municipality leaders from their posts will have wide international repercussions. It is bound to create a state of utter confusion in the towns. The local authority discharged many important functions in the supplying of services. Israel preferred to shut its eyes to many negative political phenomena that clung to the local authority. For example, permitting Jordanian intervention and subsequently intervention by other Arab states. These were careful to fill the coffers of the local authorities and thus maintain a covert political presence.

Inflicting the full penalty of the law in the case of the Shechem leader, despite the pleadings of his colleagues and his readiness to apologize, will arouse negative reactions in the general public. It will add difficulties to Sadat's situation, although it may not extend to a deterioration in the autonomy talks. Experience has proven that Egypt looks the other way at the same moment it is voicing a protest against Israeli actions in the territories. She did not halt the talks even when the government permitted Jews to purchase land in Judea and Samaria and when it widened and increased the settlements. This approach lends itself to different interpretations, but this is not the moment to assess the significance of her acceptance of the situation. At times she is suspect and gives rise to apprehensions.

As noted above, the Ministers' Committee was privy to facts unknown to us. It has already been stated: "A judge can decide only on the evidence his eyes perceive." What the eye perceives in this case raises some doubts as to the intelligence shown in continuing the exile procedure. We fear that the loss will exceed the anticipated gain. In any event we should proceed slowly and wait for the judicial decision. What's the hurry?

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CSO: 4805



## TABLE SHOWS PRICE INCREASES IN BASIC COMMODITIES

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 20 Nov 79 p 1

[Text] Basic commodities:

What we previously paid and what we shall pay now.

Commodity	New Price in lira	Last Price in lira	Price in Oct 1977	Price Before Oct 1977	Price Increase in percent
Bread, single loaf 750 gram	5.00	3.50	1.80	1.55	222
Milk 1 liter	16.10	7.60	3.40	2.95	445
Margarine 200 grams	9.00	7.20	2.20	1.90	373
Soybean oil 1 liter	49.00	32.20	5.70	4.90	900
Laban	4.75	2.55	1.05	0.90	427
Butter 100 grams	16.60	8.30	2.90	2.90	564
Cottage cheese	16.65	8.05	3.55	2.55	455

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SAFIRE URGES EXPANDED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN MIDEAST

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 30 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial by Michel Abu Jawdah: "Two Truths and Two Justices"]

[Text] At a news conference on the crisis in Iran, prior to the announcement of the complaint to the International Court of Justice, President Carter was careful to say that he had not been subjected to pressure from Dr Kissinger to allow the shah to enter the United States for medical treatment, and that he had made the decision himself and did not regret it.

The American President can say that because it is natural for him not to disavow a decision he has made. However, the WASHINGTON POST had reported before the news conference that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance tried to placate an angry Dr Kissinger because the BOSTON GLOBE newspaper had mentioned that a senior State Department official told it that the former secretary of state, during the pressure campaign he and David Rockefeller were mounting in favor of admitting the shah to the United States, threatened to hold the Carter administration responsible for the death of the shah if it failed to permit the former Iranian ruler to enter the United States for cancer treatment.

At the end of its news report the WASHINGTON POST noted, confidently and simply, that it is well known that Dr Kissinger has in fact pressured the Carter administration to permit the shah to enter the United States.

And so we have again two or more American facts. As usual, too, there are two or more opinions. How many American views there are, nowadays, on the crisis in Iran.

The latest and most important view was advanced by a well-known columnist in the NEW YORK TIMES, commentator William Safire, in which he called upon President Carter to consider Imam Khomeyni's conduct of holding the hostages "a gift from heaven" and to make use of it to bar any timid or foolhardy attitude. That is to say, the United States should take advantage of the situation, as the columnist writes, to take a number of steps which

would daringly restore the influence and presence of the United States, as follows:

First, he calls upon the United States to lease the two modern airbases which Israel will be returning to Egypt--and which are the most modern advanced airports in the world. They were built as airbases with the technical assistance of the United States and can receive atomic bombers. That is because if the United States were forced to carry out a strategic strike in the Middle East, as Mr Safire says, American aircraft could only take off from Guam to Diego Garcia for refueling, because all airspaces on the way to Iran and the Gulf are closed.

So far it is simple. The American columnist, however, advances his argument by saying that the two Sinai airports would thus become like the Guantanamo base in Cuba, and that their rent money would solve some of Egypt's economic problems. He also says that to do all this, a land force should be dispatched to the two airports. This way, the United States would be able to come to the aid of the Arab Gulf states.

The American columnist goes further. He says that the United States should lease, in Bahrain and in the islands close to Oman, facilities for providing supply services to the American carriers that are now roaming the seas close to the Gulf.

Mr Safire adds that, to further reassure the friends of the United States, President Carter should increase the level of his support of King Hassan in his conflict with Algeria.

Finally, the columnist in the NEW YORK TIMES says--and here is the crux of the matter--the American President should overcome the guilt complex which has gripped the United States since Vietnam.

All this talk in the leading American newspaper points to several things--conspicuously, the difficulty of any American military move toward the Gulf and the continued dependence on staging grounds or supply facilities in the Arab world. It also points up the need for a line connecting [the U.S. with] Morocco, Egypt, and Bahrain so that the United States may be able to cross the Atlantic and reach the Middle East.

And so the United States may not only be in need of Arab oil in its battle with Iran, but also in need of Arab land. These are the two American truths with regard to the Arab situation.

Escalation continues around those truths. The shah's return to Mexico was countered by an Iranian threat to the American subjects in opposition to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. All these are additional symbols related to justice in two different worlds--symbols that can be added to the host of political, religious, and historical symbols.

WEST FAILS TO COMPREHEND IMAM'S AVERSION TO MEDIATION

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 28 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial by Michel Abu Jawdah: "Al-Husayn's Rebellion in Qom"]

[Text] Instead of mounting a military attack, the United States might consider the whole of Iran as an embassy and impose on it, directly or by proxy, an air, sea, and land blockade backed by an embargo on supplies--which Imam Khomeyni belittles--because Iran imports wheat and various other staple foods. In addition to the blockade, the United States might resort to a psychological, information, political, and diplomatic blockade, backed by rumors and scare talk, to the extent it would consider sufficient to either paralyze the movement of the Iranian civilian and religious leaders or create a state of restiveness and constriction in Iranian air and land military circles or a state of tension and confusion in the Iranian Navy.

The French daily LE MONDE says that the economic, financial, and oil war between the United States and Iran is no longer subject to any rules or norms. Each side is using all acceptable and unacceptable weapons. The war has engulfed the friends of the two sides, which is almost reminiscent of the situation between the Allies and the Axis powers in World War II. Indeed, they remind some of the Napoleonic wars and the naval and land blockades of past history.

Imam Khomeyni attacks the Security Council and considers it subservient to the United States. The United States reduces the number of staffers in its embassies in a dozen Islamic states, including, thank God, Lebanon. The war between "Islam and the infidels" that the imam declared from Qom has made the United States--and some Europeans as well--behave as if the atmosphere were that of the Crusades, although America did not exist at the time of the Crusades.

There is, of course, a struggle now between rational American thinking and dangerous American thinking. As usual, politicians and writers in the United States have split into two groups: one group calling for prudence, the other advising adventurism. In the midst of the tragedy,

Americans reminisced about the history of their national unity. All of them, however, have raised their voices in unison demanding that their sons at the embassy in Tehran be returned. This is natural. But in return, they face an imam who can also rally around him the sons of his country--and maybe the sons of other Islamic countries--who also raise their voices in unison asking for the return of the shah and his funds.

In the midst of all this, some French and European--but not American--writers have begun to recall their past knowledge or to seek the help of some books to argue that the imamists' belief in the infallibility of the imam--in other words, that the imam does not err and therefore does not accept mediation--could be one of the basic complexes in the attitude of Imam Khomeyni and that it accounts for his refusal to accept mediation, the latest of which has been offered by the Security Council. If those French and European writers acquired more knowledge, they would find themselves before something that they do not know--namely, that the imamists have been averse to mediation and mediators since the day of the famous mediation in the early Islamic period, which they have regretted and still do, and which they still vividly remember--although they have not mentioned it--in these days, the anniversary of the rebellion of Imam al-Husayn, the martyred imam.

Therefore, neither the Americans nor the members of the Security Council have understood the symbols involved here. Abulhassan Banisadr refused to go to New York before 'Ashura not only because it is a religious occasion but because his name is that of Abulhassan, the nickname of Imam 'Ali, because the American blockade of Iran would be similar to the siege by Yazid's soldiers of the martyrs of Karbala, because the Security Council's mediation provokes in Imam Khomeyni's mind memories of the mediation between Imam 'Ali and Mu'awiyah, and because Imam Khomeyni has put the Iranians and many other people in the Islamic world in an atmosphere of martyrdom and heroism befitting the memory of "Ashura."

Anyone who pays careful attention to the words of Imam Khomeyni, to his talk about jihad, feels a certain tremor as if the atmosphere were that of the martyrdom and heroism of al-Husayn, and as if the man in Qom were a descendant of the house--and people--of the man who was in Karbala.

All of this is something that the Americans, the Security Council, or Westerners in general, and even a large number of Levantines, do not understand. But hostility with Imam Khomeyni requires that his adversaries understand their enemy so that they may master the means of fighting him. Mao Zedong has said that half the battle is to know who we are and who the enemy is. Who are the Americans and who is Khomeyni? They [the Americans] might be surprised if they were told that they are waging a war some aspects of which are 14 centuries old. And even the Security Council might not comprehend a translation of the words--and attitudes--of Imam Khomeyni, even if they were translated by all their interpreters. A war, maybe even a world war, might break out because of an error in translation--translation of the personality and of history--and comprehension may occur only after war has broken out.



IRANIAN ACTIONS, DEMANDS HAVE NO HISTORICAL PRECEDENT

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 25 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial by Michel Abu Jawdah: "Before the Third World and the 15th Century"]

[Text] The NEW YORK TIMES says that the American administration has been unable thus far to develop a plan of U.S. military intervention in Iran, and implies that some proposals call for the destruction of Iranian oil installations. This was published on the day Mr Abulhassan Banisadr, who is in charge of Iran's foreign affairs, was telling the U.N. Secretary General that the solution of the American Embassy question is quite easy and can be achieved by handing the shah and his deposits over to the Iranian Government. The American rejection of that is, of course, well known.

The French daily LE MONDE says that the United States is in a real predicament, and that President Carter has been pushed into a corner into which no other American President has been pushed, although his country is far stronger than the country that has placed him in that fix.

Of course, no mediator or third party has been able thus far to find a solution or an outlet. The overwhelming majority of the world's nations find themselves automatically calling for the release of the hostages. And of course, no state has supported the idea of the shah's extradition to Iran, since most states either give shelter to political refugees on their soil or have political refugees in one or another neighboring or faraway country but have never asked for their extradition or for the return of their money and possessions.

There is almost no precedent in the modern world to the demand for the extradition of the shah and the handing over of his deposits. The czar of Russia was killed along with all members of his family. The Ottoman sultan's caliphate was abolished. King Faruq was sent away peacefully. The former dictator of Cuba sought refuge in the United States and accepted the fact that Dr Castro had assumed power. As for Chiang Kai-shek, he set up a government in Formosa and continued to consider it China and

to threaten to return to the mainland, while Mao Zedong and his regime were safe and well. This briefly is the story of the revolutions of transformation in the modern world.

The shah's story, therefore, seems different. He had fallen once before but managed to return to power. When he left Iran several months ago, he sought refuge in Egypt, then Morocco, and refused to seek refuge in the United States which had offered it to him because, as he said, he did not want his expected return to Iran to be associated with his taking shelter in the United States. When things changed a great deal in Iran, he began to persistently request shelter in the United States and got it.

The shah's case is also unique in that he has not yet abdicated the throne. And so, one wonders whether the United States, if it ever won out against Imam Khomeyni, would want to reinstate the shah. Why has President Carter not wondered whether it has occurred to Imam Khomeyni, when the shah was permitted to enter the United States, that some American circles might arrange for his restoration? The situation in Iran and around it, as well as the situation concerning Iran, places the rulers in Tehran, along with the imam in Qom, in a state of constant fear--a fear no one pays attention to but themselves--of any move by the shah or Dr Bakhtiar or any Iranian political or military personality outside Iran.

Therefore there are those who wonder why the U.S. Government, instead of developing a plan for a military offensive, does not suggest a practical political solution whereby the shah is persuaded to abdicate the throne. Would that be enough?

It appears as though events have overtaken that question and the answer to it. The next few days may see explosions on the sidelines which would focus the spotlight on something other than the Iranian-American crisis, especially if Imam Khomeyni managed to generalize the Iranian state of affairs and to portray any possible American military intervention as a colonialist return to Iran and a new chapter of interference in Iran's affairs in the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Therefore, the present situation in Iran can be likened to the situation created by the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which prompted the two colonialist powers, Britain and France, whose power was declining and whose position was coveted by America and Russia, to develop plans for a military attack against Egypt, and to carry out those plans with the participation of Israel.

And yet the situation here seems to be far more serious than the Suez precedent, because the United States and the Soviet Union have not been proved yet to be in collusion or in a state of decline. Imam Khomeyni was able to stir an Islamic world, but he has not yet moved a modern world to show the extent of his strength, as he has stirred and moved the Iranian people against the shah's soldiers, while also showing that American and any other foreign soldiers can be neutralized--or defeated--by

human masses, as the Iranian Army experienced. As a successful model for internal resistance, the imam now emerges as a new and unique alternative which can be adopted as a means to resisting and confronting foreign ambitions in the Third World at the outset of the 15th Hegira century. Therein lie all the modern historical symbols and notions.

9254

CSO: 4802

LEBANON

SOUTH LEBANESE SHI'ITES UNDERGO TRAINING

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 12 Dec 79 p 6

[Article: "Students From the Border Strip Villages Have Begun Weapons Training"]

[Excerpt] Training sessions on first aid began yesterday in official secondary schools in the border strip villages in which both male and female students participated under the supervision of women instructors.

In Bint Jubayl secondary school, training went beyond first aid to the use of weapons.

Yesterday noon, 75 students assembled in a place near to a school in the town and listened to two female instructors from the border militias on methods of aiming and firing German-made automatic rifles and fired live rounds at simulated human targets.

Students at the session said that these training sessions would continue over 5 days during which 375 young people from Bint Jubayl and surrounding areas would participate and "were taking place at our request in response to Iran's intention to send volunteers to the south."

They added: "Whether or not the Iranians back off from their decision, we will stay on the lookout for any development in support of our noble spiritual colleagues who have said 'no' to Iran."

The students hoisted placards one of which carried the wording: "Iran for the Shi'ites of Iran; the south for the Shi'ites of the south."

8389

CSO: 4802

PFLP GRADUATION CEREMONY

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 13 Dec 79 p 6

[Article: "Habbash: Protection of the Weapon in Lebanon Is a Central Link of Our Plan"]

[Text] The secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], Dr George Habbash, feels that the central link of the imperialist plan is now focused on eliminating the Palestinian weapon in Lebanon and therefore the central link of our plan must now be to protect this weapon on Lebanese soil.

Habbash was speaking at the graduation ceremony for the second batch (the Khalid Abu 'Ayshah batch) at the PFLP military academy on the 12th anniversary of the birth of the front.

The ceremony was attended by representative of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, the PDRY, the Libyan Jamahiriya, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, "the Nationalist Movement" and groups of the Palestinian resistance.

The ceremony was opened by the PFLP anthem and then the graduating officers entered the courtyard, passed in review before Dr Habbash and then took their places with their arms in the center of the courtyard.

A member of the military committee of the front delivered the address on behalf of the academy and talked about its establishment.

An officer, Ra'id Bukri, who delivered the address on behalf of the cadets, said that its establishment was "an important accomplishment in confronting the fierce attack."

Habbash's Address

The address on behalf of the front was delivered by its secretary general, Dr George Habbash, who called upon everyone for "a new year filled with programmed action, results and greater accomplishments."



He said: We are aware that the central link of the imperialist plan at this time is focused on eliminating the Palestinian weapon in Lebanon.

"I reaffirm that we are fully aware of the plan that has been laid down for the whole Arab area, for the PDRY, the National Progressive Front in North Yemen, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, and we know the purpose of the Egyptian mobilizations on Libya's border. We are aware of the plan that is aimed at making our people in occupied Palestine despair by picking out a group of traitors to work with them in the autonomy conspiracy. We are aware of the preparations being made to strike a blow at the revolution of the heroic people of Iran.

"They believe that by striking at the Palestinian and Lebanese weapon, they will be able to fragment the position of Arab steadfastness that emerged after al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Therefore, protection of the Palestinian weapon on Lebanese soil must become our central link in our plans. This must become our duty in the PFLP and the Palestinian revolution and the nationalist movement."

He went on to say: "They try to make us look as if we are living in the past. Forget it. We are not here by accident. Despite all their attempts since April 1975 and right up to this moment, this weapon has been raised high over the soil of Lebanon."

With regard to relations with the "Nationalist Movement," he said: "We must carry a big responsibility in the issue of our relationship with the Lebanese nationalist movement and in how we understand this relationship because we must reconsider all our mistakes in this regard so that the nationalist movement can become solely responsible for mobilizing the Lebanese masses and solely responsible for the Lebanese nationalist arena. Our duty in the Palestinian revolution must be to offer it all possible support so that it can become the movement primarily responsible for leading the battle in the Lebanese arena. The presence of the Palestinian revolution on Lebanese soil ought not, consciously or not, obstruct the role of the Lebanese nationalist movement. We must take responsibility toward the role of the Arab and international progressive forces that through their support for the revolution have helped us stand fast up to now despite all the conspiracies."

Dr Habbash passed out the graduation certificates to the cadets and handed out prizes to those who had shown superior achievements.

8389

CSO: 4802

## TOUR OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS BY JOURNALISTS

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 20 Dec 79 p 6

[Article: "General Khuri: The Army Is Ready To Move Anywhere and With the Service to the Flag Its Number Will Rise to 40,000"]

[Text] The information department of the army command yesterday invited the Lebanese press and editors of Arab and foreign news bureaus to visit the Higher Military Instruction Institute, the Third Defense Battalion and the military school on the occasion of the institute's commencing operations, the battalion's stationing around the Ministry of Defense and the military school's reception of first year officer cadets.

At 1000 hours the director of information in the army, Colonel (Air) Mahmud Matar, welcomed the journalists in the canteen of the Ministry of Information and distributed the program for the visit. They then were taken in military vehicles to the building of the Higher Military Instruction Institute in al-Luwayzah where they were welcomed by its director, Colonel Zuhayr al-Tanir. He spoke to them about the history of the founding of the institute and its missions. He told them that it had been established in 1975 in Beirut and had been called the Higher Military Instruction Center, its mission being to hold battalion commanders' courses for officers of the rank of captain and major. On 24 November 1979, the center moved to its present building, took on the name institute and now is in the developmental stage.

### The Mission of the Institute

The institute's mission is to disseminate higher military instruction, to work to improve the general education and military standards of officers, to prepare them to assume command of tactical units with various weapons and to assume responsibilities as staff officers, to hold training sessions to qualify commanding officers for promotion in conformity with Article 57 of the national defense statute, to assist in laying down the combat doctrine of the armed forces and to fuse the military learning which the officers have received in various military institutes outside Lebanon into a single mold in light of the combat doctrine of the Lebanese armed forces.

## The Institute's Courses

A number of training courses are given at the institute, namely: the staff technology course, the battalion commanders' course, the passing rank course, staff courses and refresher courses.

The curriculum of the first course is centered on the following bases: military subjects on the level of staffs and large units, educational subjects, strategic defense questions, sociology, political economics, diplomatic history and international law. The instructions in the subjects is handled by instructors all of whom carry staff certificates and are from the cadre of the institute or outside it or are foreign experts or instructors from the Lebanese University. This course lasts about a year.

## Future Outlook

In order to raise the standard of the institute, the command is working on the following: To send missions from the institute's command to international staff institutes to be apprised of the latest developments and documentation in the field of military sciences and organizational affairs, to insure constant contact with foreign military attaches accredited to Lebanon and with the Lebanese University so that the institute may be supplied with its requirements for source materials and information in the military, organizational and educational fields, to obtain surplus reconnaissance materials from one of the advanced countries to be organized by the institute's command for the officer cadets during the course and to attach every officer who has finished a staff course abroad to the institute so that his comrades may benefit from what he has learned.

## The Third Defense Battalion

From the institute, the reporters, accompanied by Lt Col Matar and a number of officers from the information department, went to where the Third Defense Battalion of the First Defense Brigade is stationed. There, they were welcomed by the battalion commander, Lt Col Michel al-Tawil, surrounded by his aides. Everyone went into a tent where the soldiers slept and listened to Lt Col al-Tawil talk about the establishment, composition and mission of the battalion. He said that it had been established on 1 September 1979 and comprised three combat companies, a headquarters company and a service company. Its authorized strength is 632 but presently has only a strength of 512. The battalion is equipped with troop carriers, jeeps and trucks so that it can move quickly. It is also equipped with heavy weapons and light individual weapons and its armaments will be filled out as shipments of weapons arrive from abroad. It will then be ready to undertake operational missions within a short time.

The commander and the reporters then reviewed a company of the battalion with its equipment.

#### At the Military School

The reporters then went to the military school where its commander, Colonel Riyad Sham'un, was awaiting them. He welcomed them in the main lecture hall and talked to them about the history of the school since its establishment in 1921 in Damascus up to the present day. He then discussed the mission of the school, its branches, the methods of selecting its students, practices followed in instruction, the complete cooperation between it and the Lebanese University, particularly the college of sciences, and modification of the curriculum for future years to conform with military and scientific developments in the advanced countries.

The reporters then asked questions and got answers. Then they toured the departments of the school, inspected the quarters and library and saw how the food was prepared. They then assembled in the big reception room where the commander of the army, General Victor Khuri, appeared before them. In front of a buffet prepared for the occasion, he talked to them about defense affairs and the preparations going on to build the new army. Among other things, he said, "The army is now considered to be in the final phase of its reconstruction. Its strength is about 22,000 men, including 15,000 combat personnel and the rest support personnel."

He was asked whether the army was able to move immediately and to go to the south with its present organization without requiring time to get ready, were the order given to move to the south or elsewhere. He said that the command could set a time to move within hours.

General Khuri concluded by saying: "There is a plan to increase the strength to 22,000 upon implementation of the law on service to the flag that will provide 18,000 men."

8389

CSO: 4802

ANTI-REGIME PUBLICATION REPORTS ATTEMPT TO KILL QADHDHAFI

London SAWT LIBYA in Arabic Nov 79 p 5

[Article: "Four Officers Storm Qadhdhafi's 'Bed' in Military Hospital Camp and Tangle With His Private Guard in Harmful Battle"]

[Text] There has been another daring attempt to assassinate the ruler of Libya, fascist Benito al-Qadhdhafi.

The operation was carried out by four officers from the armored service, who stormed the military hospital camp in the city of Benghazi at 1430 on the morning of 4 October and fought with the guards. The fierce battle ended with the heroic death of the four officers, while two officers from the colonel's guard were killed and another was wounded.

During the battle Qadhdhafi, who was at the camp, was able to slip out a back door, and he hurried to his private plane and escaped to the city of Tripoli.

Qadhdhafi pretended that night that he would sleep at the headquarters of the republican guard at 'al-Birkah,' and as camouflage he placed a doubled guard at the headquarters, while the colonel slipped away to the military hospital camp to spend the night there and appointed a doubled guard from the private forces as a precaution against emergencies.

After 1400 the guards were surprised by two Volvos, carrying four officers led by the officer "al-Tawurgha," which burst into the entrance toward the colonel's bed. However, the guards quickly opened fire, and the attacking officers answered with continuous bursts of machine gun fire. The battle raged until the attackers were shot and fell as martyrs, one after another.

Qadhdhafi miraculously escaped from this daring attempt, but that is what impelled him to purge the army and form "revolutionary committees" within its ranks in the manner which he announced at the "Talmithah" meeting later.

The martyrdom of the four brave officers led to great confusion in Qadhdhafi's intelligence circles, which as yet have not discovered one thread of evidence



about the roots of the attempt. Whether it was an individual attempt or an operation planned by a secret organization within the armed forces is still being kept within its secret circles, which means that this operation is only the vanguard of other subsequent operations.

The attempt also moved Qadhdhafi to create his new private guard, which he named "the Green Guard." Its leadership has been entrusted to one of Qadhdhafi's family, Hasan Ashkal, who has been given an exceptional promotion by Qadhdhafi to the rank of colonel!

It is well-known that Major Hasan Ashkal began his career as a regular policeman on the police force of the wilayah of Fezzan, before his star rose as one of Qadhdhafi's prominent advisors after the Fatih Revolution. Hasan Ashkal participated in the Chad operations in which his forces suffered heavy losses and disgraceful defeats, as SAWT LIBYA described in a previous edition.

7587

CSO: 4802

## ANTI-REGIME ANALYSIS OF ARMY POLICY OFFERED

London SAWT LIBYA in Arabic Nov 79 pp 12-13

[Article: "Al-Qadhdhafi Disbands His Army, Forms Army of Mercenaries"]

[Text] People may find some logic in Qadhdhafi's insistence on a military service of the people and his wide movement to train and mobilize them, from school pupils to old men, to embody as far as possible the thesis of "establishment of the authority of the armed people" which is contained in the Green Book.

One must assume, in order for this logic to be correct, that Libya lives in a state of war or that it is surrounded on its five borders by hostile states waiting for the opportunity to attack it and planning to occupy it.

Therefore, urgent national need requires that the people be trained to bear arms and prepare for the day of battle, no matter what the cost in hardship, effort, damaging the progress of public utilities and hindering production, and no matter how much military operations, mobilization and training are surrounded by all forms of efforts, humiliation, hardships and dangers.

The question then is the question of a nation about to be occupied.

War with the neighbors is coming, there is no doubt about it, but Qadhdhafi's decision to form "revolutionary committees" within his regular army will result in a group of important matters which cannot be set straight without the discipline, bases, and rules on which the military and the principles of the organization of the armed forces are based. The building of the regular army requires them, and they are also required for the type of modern weapons which it will obtain and use.

For example, how can the Russian missiles and the diverse, complex modern weapons be used if the regular army is converted to nothing but "popular groups" with no control, no connection, and no tight discipline.

Some years ago Qadhdhafi abolished the application of most of the basic military principles within the army. He abolished the post of minister of

defense and kept all of its responsibilities for himself. He dissolved the general staff and then removed officers from the organization and command of their squadrons, and turned over to enlisted men the responsibility for camps and issuing orders. He also abolished all consideration of military rank, and these ranks no longer appear except at the symbolic reviews which are organized on special occasions.

Military abilities and qualifications no longer hold any importance. Instead, Qadhdhafi has been getting rid of men as soon as they graduate from the military colleges to which they were sent and before they join the service, in addition to the constant discharge movement and the continuous elimination of anyone who appears to have talent or prominence in any of the technical fields within the army.

As a matter of fact, Qadhdhafi's army has been converted into an army of soldiers whose only leader is Qadhdhafi himself.

Qadhdhafi did all of this to the army under pressure of the fear that he would see a repetition of the "trick" of stealing authority under cover of darkness, enabling some of the officers to overthrow him.

Despite all of this, this army is still troubling him and forcing him to think of anything that might cripple the opposition movement and lessen its danger to him.

Everything in Qadhdhafi's imagination and fears seems to be coming.

Everything is coming, but Qadhdhafi is forming "revolutionary committees" within his regular army, and that is difficult to understand.

Suppose the army is dissolved, and Qadhdhafi gets rid of its regular units and relaxes, or at least gives himself some reassurance.

When that happens, then for whom is Qadhdhafi purchasing the most modern and advanced weapons and military equipment?

Who will direct the network of Russian missiles which are now aimed at the borders of Egypt, Tunisia and Chad??

Who will command the MIG-25 planes and move and operate the varied and complex weapons?? The revolutionary committees which Qadhdhafi is now forming from elements of his tribe and mercenaries who were granted Libyan citizenship by claiming that they are Libyans returning from exile cannot handle the advanced modern weapons which Qadhdhafi is importing in dreadful quantities. All that these "armed gangs" need to play their repressive role in protecting the regime are conventional light weapons.

We go back to the question: For whom, then, is Qadhdhafi buying all of these weapons?

During the month of September the leadership of the National Democratic Movement in Tripoli received a secret report supported by official documents containing a body of important information. Here we mention part of it in the following points:

Qadhdhafi is continuing to recruit numbers of mercenary soldiers of various nationalities: Tunisian, Moroccan, Chadian, Palestinian, Sudanese, Italian and North Korean. They now number about 16,000 soldiers. Russian officers oversee their training on various types of Russian weapons.

Qadhdhafi considers the army of mercenaries which he is now forming to be an efficient army which will protect him against any armed movement or popular uprising. With it he will secure his "popular revolutionary" regime and guarantee permanence and stability for this regime.

As of now and until Qadhdhafi's army of mercenaries is ready, there are 1,200 Polish and Bulgarian commando soldiers in Libya which Qadhdhafi had requested from the Warsaw Pact by way of the Russians. They are working in the armed forces as engineers, experts and technicians, but their real role is to move at a suitable time to protect Qadhdhafi personally and thwart any coup attempt.

The American CIA is aware of the presence of these covert forces, and the authorities in Washington have contacted the Russians. The Soviet Union replied that the information available to them indicates that a surprise move might be anticipated which could result in a change of regime outside the world of the two major powers, which could upset the agreed-upon balance of power.

With regard to the air force, Qadhdhafi some time ago began to use professional foreign pilots: Italians, Russians and East Germans. They are hired on a volunteer basis in return for tempting salaries reaching 10,000 dollars per pilot per month, in addition to a group of benefits.

Large numbers of pilots in the Italian army have deserted or resigned as a result of Qadhdhafi's temptations, which has caused a great deal of concern on the part of the government. There have been several contacts recently between the Italian Government and Qadhdhafi, and the matter ended with Qadhdhafi's pledge not to use more Italian pilots.

In light of this information from the secret report, we can understand the meaning of Qadhdhafi's current trend to dissolve the Libyan army under the umbrella of what are called "revolutionary committees" which he formed within it. Their first resolution was to "pursue revolutionary supervision of the army and crush immediately any attempt against the revolution."

Nine serious attempts to overthrow Qadhdhafi have occurred within the army but have failed because of foreign intervention and the cooperation of the American CIA with Col Mu'ammr Qadhdhafi. That left an impression with everyone that the "regular" Libyan army, despite all of the continual efforts to eliminate it, is not a force he can trust, because Qadhdhafi as a statesman or even as a soldier has not won the confidences of anyone within or outside of the army.

## MAURITANIA

### EEC DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR GENERAL'S VISIT REPORTED

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 20 Dec 79 pp 1, 8

[Text] Mr Meyer, the director general of development for the European Economic Community (EEC), arrived in Nouakchott yesterday morning at the head of an important delegation from the EEC, for a two-day visit in our country.

At the airport, where he was welcomed by Maj Moulaye O. Boukhreiss, a member of the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] and minister of Planning and Fishing, Mr Meyer told us that the goal of his visit in our country is to establish a program with the Mauritanian government for European Community assistance to Mauritania for the next five years. This assistance, he said, is granted under the Lome Convention, which links the EEC with several developing countries, chiefly in Africa.

Mauritania, he added, is one of those countries. It is within this framework, Mr Meyer told us, that the Community envisions establishing the program of assistance to Mauritania for the next five years.

But before that, the sectors in which the aid is to be utilized must be defined, he concluded.

Mr Meyer, who is to be received this afternoon by Lt Col Mohamed Mahmoud O. Ahmed Louly, chairman of the CMSN and chief of state, talked late yesterday morning with Ahmed O. Zein, minister of Finance and Commerce and acting minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

The EEC mission also held a working session last evening with a Mauritanian delegation presided over by Maj Moulaye O. Boukhreiss, a member of the CMSN and minister of Planning and Fishing, and in the presence of Maj Thiam El Hadj, a member of the CMSN and minister of Youth, Sports, Handicraft and Tourism, and Mohamed El Moctar O. Zamel, minister of Industry and Mining.

We note that the EEC delegation is leaving the capital this evening for Dakar.



## MAURITANIA

### AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS LISTED

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 18 Dec 79 p 3

[Excerpt] This vital rural sector was abandoned for a long period, which favored the ravages of the drought.

Recently, the minister of Rural Development established a new program, conceived of in terms of the orientations of the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] and the government, which is concerned with arriving at short-term food self-sufficiency.

Efforts are now being undertaken with the goal of preserving and promoting our resources, while assuring the protection of nature exposed to multiple dangers, notably fire, felling of trees, etc.

In fact, man continues to act irresponsibly against nature.

Today desertification is becoming an unarguable reality, and we are realizing the importance of vegetative cover, the only weapon against the advance of the desert that is threatening our country.

So it is time for this sector to take the place that belongs to it.

It is more than necessary to go on to the application of the programs already drawn up.

Thus, to produce and work should be our motto.

In fact, unless the necessary measures are taken, this priority will be a dead letter and our milieu will continue to deteriorate.

It is unarguable that development requires actions at the level of each region to generalize the drilling of wells, the development of cultivatable areas, reforestation and the creating of agricultural cooperatives.

The agricultural cooperatives already instituted should play the role that is incumbent upon them, with the goal of limiting the rural exodus.

In short, this is our principal weapon for arriving at our objective, which is food self-sufficiency; this comes to pass through setting up viable agricultural projects.

This is done to relieve the food shortages that have been the cause of the rural exodus. Within this framework, several projects have seen the light of day, such as the M'Pourie Plain at Rosso and the Kaedi agricultural project, which went through two seasons in the past year. The total area of the Kaedi project is 50 hectares and its production has been evaluated at 203 tons of rice. During the second agricultural season there was some question about agricultural cooperatives which did not have as much area as 136 hectares, and production went up to 687 tons of rice.

The average production per hectare was 4.8 tons.

With regard to the experimental agricultural area, it is 700 hectares; its first season began at the end of last July.

Average production was 3.8 tons of crude rice per hectare. The total production of this area (Kaedi) amounts to 542,453 tons of crude rice.

These results eloquently demonstrate the success of this project and open up pleasing prospects for the future.

The development of this project requires combining several ~~un~~flagging efforts in order to activate this sector on which over 90 percent of our populations depend.

8946

CSO: 4400

SOCIOECONOMIC PRESSURES OF SAHARAN CONFLICT UNDERLINED

Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 79 pp 48,49

[Article by Mireille Duteil: "Morocco at the Crossroads"]

[Text] In that wretched quarter on the periphery of Casablanca, the new super-highway connecting the two Moroccan metropolises cuts a vast shanty town in two. A striking picture of today's Morocco. Modernism and poverty coexist without mingling. Two worlds alien to each other. In the chilly dawn of Casablanca before the street cleaners' time, gangs of ragged children in torn trousers, barefooted, comb through the garbage cans looking for a crust of bread. Others are still asleep pressing closely together, curled up in the shelter of a carriage gateway. The small thefts of these homeless youngsters or the small coins given them at the market for carrying baskets barely enable them not to die of hunger. One sees them fighting over a cigarette stub, breathing in the gasoline fumes from exhaust pipes as a form of narcotic, make sandwiches with shoe polish or get drunk with "el hanout whisky," a strange and fatal mixture made of lemonade and methylated spirits.

It is not yet Calcutta, of course, and this not yet adult Lumpenproletariat on whom the economic capital looks with an indifferent eye, represents an extreme case. Nevertheless, a few years ago such scenes were unimaginable in Morocco.

The reasons? The rural exodus, primitive urbanization, a wildly increasing demography (with an annual 3.5 percent growth rate, one of the highest in the world): Forty-seven percent of the Moroccan population, that is, 9,200,000 people, are under 15 years old. Now, it is in the 15 to 19 year-old age group that the unemployed are most numerous: 33.7 percent as compared with 7.1 percent among those 30 to 34 years of age. Only a tiny minority (2.5 percent) of the children who start school will complete secondary school studies and be able to aspire to get into a university. "For these privileged individuals, jobs are not lacking," and observer commented. "But the great majority of the remainder will not find work." A tragic fact from one end of the continent to the other.

But here in addition there is the war... A war which has lasted for 4 years and costs Morocco more and more. "Military expenditures come to 4 billion dirhams,"\* declared Abdelkamel Reghaye, minister of finance. But according to

\*A dirham is equal to 1.10 French francs.

some private sources, the expenses of the Ministries of Defense and Interior broadly speaking, come close to 9 billion dirhams out of a 20 billion budget in 1979. The purchase of sophisticated arms and maintaining in the Sahara 36,000 men (one-third of the army) who receive double pay, weigh heavily upon the budget.

Now, the Moroccan treasury's receipts are not unlimited. The volume and value of the phosphate exports, the country's chief resource is stagnating (19 million tons and \$32 a ton). The economic marasma is not only attributable to the war, nonetheless Rabat has been forced to choose between "guns and butter."

"As the ranking employer and investor," and industrialist explained, "the state devotes its means to military objectives on a priority basis: 60 to 70 percent of the public investment potential is swallowed up by the war effort." In other terms, nearly 17 percent of national production is absorbed by the army.

That is why King Hassan last year found himself obliged to give up an ambitious 5-year plan (1978-1982) in favor of a 3-year "transitional" plan. Austerity has been made the order of the day, imports slowed down and public investments considerably reduced: 40 percent in the 1978 budget. The same austerity policy in 1979 and stagnation of investments. As for the 1980 finance bill, it is marked by the same concern. Many sectors in which the state plays a leading role, such as public works and construction which traditionally create jobs, are directly affected by the consequences of that policy.

"War or no war, the investment rate should have dropped," a banker stated. "Morocco," he went on, "in that sphere is recovering its normal rate following the phosphate boom. The bottleneck we are experiencing is that of men. It is futile to build plants if there are no men to operate them." However that may be, the stop hit is a brutal one. At the end of 1978, enterprises that were victims of a general treasury crisis aggravated by the lack of assets of a state that did not pay its bills, went bankrupt. Employees, trade unions and opposition parties, fearing a recrudescence of unemployment, protested against the government's policy. Prices rose dramatically: 15 percent added to the housewife's market basket.

A wave of strikes hit Morocco: 976 in 1978. The culminating point was reached in the spring of 1979 when longshoremen, bus drivers, health personnel, bank employees and teachers went on strike. Maati Bouabid's government, formed last 22 March, responded with firmness. It sent out the police forces, fired 648 teachers, arrested a few tens of them. But he increased the minimum wage by 40 percent (which rose from 1.40 to 1.95 dirhams an hour) and low wages by 15 percent.

A hot re-opening was feared. This did not happen despite sporadic strikes in some industrial sectors and among the students. The fact is that this war which is costing so heavily for the time being is still the king's best

card. In the name of "reconquering territorial integrity," the opposition parties, the students and the three trade union organizations formed a sacred union. And Moroccan political life has regained a certain air of freedom which many fear to see disappear. A swindle? Each person thinks he is going to profit from it:

The opposition parties. In 1975, the Moroccan sovereign, in return for the parties' support of his Saharan policy, agreed to the democratization of political life. In 1977, the legislative elections restored life to Parliament.

The students. In November 1978, the UNEM (National Union of Moroccan Students) close to the USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces] socialists, banned since 1973, recovered its legal status. Its banning marked the signal for several years of disturbances and strikes. Then many arrested students were released gradually, notably following the publication of an International Amnesty report on the violation of human rights in Morocco. At the time of its first congress last October, UNEM by a large majority passed a motion supporting Morocco's policy in the Sahara.

The trade unions. Despite the confrontations at the beginning of the year and in particular with the creation in November 1978 of the new CDT [Democratic Confederation of Workers], close to the socialists and solidly entrenched in the public sector, the trade unions also supported the government's policy regarding Morocco's "number 1 problem." "If the army cannot restore our territorial integrity for us," El-Amaoui, CDT secretary general, declared, "the people will take up arms and fight."

But will this sacred union stand up to a deterioration of the economic situation? Last spring, the government's failure to abide by the democratization agreement on the occasion of the arrests for going on strike already made the leaders of the opposition grind their teeth. "For us there is a direct connection between maintaining the internal front and the democratic process begun in 1976," Abderrahim Bouabig, USFP leader, then told us. "If this process is brought back into question, we will be forced to draw conclusions from it." Ali Yata, a communist, leader of the PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism], holds the same views.

In return for supporting the monarch's policy, the Left opposition is demanding reforms: fiscal reform, a struggle against corruption and waste, improvement of the lot of the poor. It is the urban residents who are the most affected by price increases. More than the people in the inland areas where nearly 70 percent of the population lives on very low incomes but with virtual self-sufficiency. "Moreover," a banker pointed out to us, "the 3 billion dirhams sent annually by the 400,000 emigrants reach the countryside and support nearly 3 million individuals." Conversely, in the cities, the low-level civil servants must tighten their belts. The case is cited of office workers or teachers (600 dirhams in wages for a beginner) who have left their apartments in the center of town to go to the suburbs where it is less fashionable and less costly. "Two thousand and 2,500 dirham rents no longer find takers as readily today," a well-off executive told us.



The government, however, refuses to speed things up, to impose a tax on wealth. It does not intend to take the risk of antagonizing business circles. It is true that well-off households furnish 2 to 3 percent of their incomes to contribute to the financing of the war effort, firms send some of their technicians and some of their white collar employees to work in the Sahara. But fiscal reform is deferred from one parliamentary session to another and the "voluntary contribution," (a loan of a permanent nature from the great fortunes) which everyone praises in principle, is not always applied. Yet in the well insulated offices of the ministries' district on Rabat's heights, it is not held secret that it would be fair and not so hard to obtain from each of the 2,000 richest individuals (a patrimony of over 10 million dirhams) a donation of 1 million dirhams for the war effort. "This voluntary contribution would in a way be a sort of tax on the external indications of wealth and would represent an adjustment at the fiscal level," a high official noted.

If the Saharan conflict goes on, the socio-economic pressure the country will undergo (an increase in the costs of raw materials: petroleum \$300 million for 1980; cereals, \$400 million in 1979; repayment of the foreign debt, 2 billion dirhams in 1979, that is, 30 percent of the value of exports) will force the Moroccan authorities to effect changes in depth. If they refuse to do so or hesitate, this pressure could become intolerable. Rabat is at the crossroads.

8094

CSO: 4400

## MICROWAVE PROJECT COMPLETED AHEAD OF SCHEDULE

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 19 Dec 79 p 1

[Text]

JEDDAH, Dec 18 — Saudi Arabia's vast microwave relay project which links the Kingdom together by telephone has been completed in record time, the minister of posts, telephones and telegraph says.

The 10,000 kilometer, 35,000 channel network was completed in 30 months. Dr. Alawi Darwish Kayyal told *Arab News*, a much shorter time than it has taken for similar projects in other countries such as Australia and Iran.

The 300 station network allows telephone subscribers in Saudi Arabia to make 35,000 long distance calls within the Kingdom at any one time, he said, and in addition the network carries two television channels.

It also includes facilities for telex, telegraph and radio transmission, he said.

"The network's stations have been built under the most diverse climatic conditions — in the desert, in valleys and on mountain tops," he said. The system now has stations in 80 towns and cities across the country.

The microwave system was built by the American firm Western Electric, which won the right to build the project through competition from European telecommunications firms.

Comparatively, Dr. Kayyal said, an Australian microwave system took ten years to complete, even though it only involved a distance of 2,500 kilometers. And in Iran, he said, a system with 500 stations took four years to complete.

One feature of the system is a 150 kilometer link with Sudan across the Red Sea, although in most cases microwave stations only have a range of 50 to 150 kilometers.

"We have carried out a unique experiment

by linking Saudi Arabia to the Sudan through the microwave network — the longest link in the world between two stations without relays," he said.

The link was made possible by the erection of 20 towers on Thaj Mountain near Taif and Laha Mountain near Port Sudan, he said.

But Dr. Kayyal said the microwave network is only one phase of Saudi Arabia's progress in telecommunications.

The huge telephone project now underway in the Kingdom will add 500,000 lines to 75 cities and villages around the country, and about 45 of them have already seen the results of the expansion project, he said.

A quarter of a million new lines have already been installed, and exchange facilities and facilities for international calls have been designed to cater to expected demand for the next 25 years, he said.

In addition, a third communications satellite station is nearing completion near Riyadh to improve Saudi communications with the rest of the world.

And as a backup for the microwave system, the Kingdom's coaxial cable network is being expanded from 1,800 to 10,000 channels for simultaneous conversations.

Dr. Kayyal also said the ministry hopes soon to be able to offer other modern communications services through the telephone network, such as data transmission from computer to computer, and transmission of facsimiles through telephone circuits. The latter would allow newspapers edited in one city, for example, to be printed in a number of other points.

He said he expects that such services will be in operation within a year.

## YAMMOTH ROAD PROJECT WILL LINK EAST WITH NORTHERN REGION

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 29 Dec 79 p 3

[Text]

DAMMAM, Dec. 28 (SPA) — A road network worth SR1,994 billion is being built to link the Eastern Province and Northern Region. The total length of the roads is 848 kilometers.

The director of the Eastern province Roads Department in Sheikh Hussein Mansouri's Ministry of Communications, Sami Fawdah, said Friday that a coast road from Dammam to Al-Khobar, with a connecting road to the port, cost SR35 million. It will be a two lane road 23 kilometers long.

A road from Khajr to Adaliyya and the Hofuf new intersection will be 99 kilometers long and cost SR157, and another Hofuf intersection, Hofuf and Qabq which is 110 kilometers long will cost SR42 million.

A 116-kilometer road from Iyan to Aqeer will cost SR128 million, and from Hafr Al-Batin to Majma'a a 200 kilometer dual-lane road will cost SR1,335 million. It will be finished shortly, Fawdah said.

A project for roads between Abu Haidariya and Ras Tanura, through Dammam and Jubail has been divided into seven parts, Fawdah said. The first is a six-lane road between Badrani and the Abu Haidariya intersection. It is 69 kilometers long and will cost SR232 million.

The second will be from Badrani to meet the first road. It will be a six lane road, cost SR228 million and 66 kilometers long. The third will be from Badrani to the Baqiy-Dhahran road intersection, six lanes of 35 kilometers, costing SR318 million.

The fourth begins from the rail-road intersection at the Ras Tanura road, and runs to Safwa. It will be 60 kilometers long with 12 lanes, and will cost SR210 million. The fifth will be a six lane road from Safwa to Ras Tanura, separate from the road to Jubail. It will be 41 kilometers long and cost SR215 million.

The sixth will be from Safwa to Jubail. It will cost SR274 million for its six lanes of 52 kilometers. The seventh and last will be a two lane road from Abu Haidariya to Dhahran and Ras Al-Zour, 37 kilometers costing SR20 million.

The maintenance of roads in the Eastern Province is carried out by the Roads Department. It maintains roads from Hafr Al-Batin to Rafha, and to Arar, Arar to Sikaka to Jouf and the road to the Jordanian border. The total length of road is 2,447 kilometers.

Another set of roads maintained by the department include those from Hafr Al-Batin to Qasim, Nairiyya to Khafji, Abu Haidariya to Dammam, Baqin to the Adaliyya intersection and

Khurais to Hofuf Salwa. Their total length comes to 961 kilometers.

Fawdah said that the roads cost SR203 million to maintain. The department has centers in Khafji, Dammam and Hofuf, with experts to supervise the conditions of the huge network which links the Eastern Province and the north.

Some roads have been finished, he said. They include one from Alkhobar to Aziziya, and its connections, which cost SR140 million. It is 21 kilometers long and has eight lanes. The Dhahran to Baqiy road, which has four lanes, cost SR69 million. It is 63 kilometers long.

Also completed is Wadi Al-Miyah dual-lane road, starting at the Nairiyya intersection and ending in Camp Ein Dar No. Two, with total length of 370 kilometers. Another 31 kilometer road from Baqiy to Salasel and to Usafmat has two lanes.

The Tapline to Abu Miyah and Huzam Umm Al-Salek road is 22 kilometers of dual lanes. A 22 two lane kilometer mountain road, beside the road from Abu Haidariyya to Dammam is finished, as is a two lane road from Nairiyya to Qatsumah, 21 kilometers long.

Fawdah said that the Roads Department of the Eastern Province has 3,800 kilometers of

roads which cost SR2.600 billion. There were other huge projects under study by consulting firms, he added.

One of those projects is a dual lane network linking Dammam to Sabhat, Ank, Qatif, Awamiya, Salwa, Alkhobar and Dhahran.

There is also a project under study for expanding the dual lane roads from Dammam to

Alkhobar, Abu Hauriya to Tuzil, the port intersection to Baqqa road, the airport road and the dual road from Dammam to Riyadh, still under construction, 390 kilometers long.

Meanwhile, it was reported that a network of roads was being constructed in the Southern Region to link populated areas in the hills with other areas.

CSO: 4820

## NEW INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT UNDER CONSTRUCTION

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English 4 Jan 80 pp 19-21, 27-28

{Article by John Close}

{Text}

The road signs no longer point bravely into nothingness. The endless fence no longer encloses empty space. Jeddah's new international airport surely destined to be nothing less than a wonder of the world, a second Karnak, is growing up.

It seems to be doing so by cell division. The first estimate of its total cost, submitted in the early 1960s by International Aeradio, was for a project costing \$ 20 million. In 1967, Airways Engineering Corp. of the United States, after another look, ventured to suggest \$ 275 million. This year, Minister of Defense Prince Sultan announced that halfway through Phase I of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill's master plan, adopted in 1974, \$ 4 billion (SR .45 billion) had been committed to the project. Virtually all of this, officials say, has been spent. Contractors are now murmuring that by the time the whole thing is finished in perhaps six years, it may well have cost close to \$ 10 billion at current prices. Without taking inflation into account, this is 50 times the original estimate.

"From nothing to everything," is how Charles Dutton of construction manager Parsons Daniel JV describes the genesis of the Jeddah airport. "I don't know if you can say this is the largest construction project ever, but in terms of money it's going to beat them all."

Almost every year, there has been a new target date announced for the grand opening. Col. Saad Yousef Amin, director of International Airports Project, a division of the Ministry of Defense says, "The exact opening date of NJIA (New Jeddah International Airport) can be set only after an in-depth evaluation using computer simulation is completed to determine the most efficient and safe air traffic control procedures available to permit simultaneous operations at both NJIA and the existing airport." And when will that be? "It is expected that the study will be completed by next spring. Following the acceptance of the study, it will be necessary to train all air and ground personnel involved in the Jeddah terminal area."

Parsons Daniel has been told to regard December of 1980 as the date to begin initial operations but no one is taking this as absolutely firm.

Work at the project, 19 kilometers north of Jeddah, was originally divided into two phases. The first was to cover two runways, an aircraft refuelling system, a north and south terminals, a TriStar maintenance hanger, an air cargo terminal, a food service building, navigation and communication systems, ground support equipment, a Royal Pavilion and the first phase of a desalination plant. Phase II, to be carried out



from 1980 to 1985 was to include a 747 hanger, a base for the Royal Saudi Air Force, the Hajj Terminal, a Saudi maintenance building, special flight services and general aviation facilities, a hospital and quarantine area, an administration building, Phase II of desalination and an air mail building.

Since Parson Daniel took over from Airways as construction manager in August of 1976, the line between the two phases has become ever more blurred. No airport can be so neatly divided because money, allocated, Col. Amin says, "on a year to year basis from the National Budget," comes in unpredictable spurts, because people change their minds about what should come first, because, in short, the sheer size of the project has stretched the net of Saudi bureaucracy as it has the imagination.

It is really three airports in one and comparisons with existing airports are not really helpful. Few international airports have a separate Royal Pavilion; none has to install vast extra capacity to handle a once-yearly event of the scale of the Pilgrimage.

In the first year of operation, every man, woman and child in the Kingdom could pass through the airport without straining capacity. The number of foreign air pilgrims could treble from this year's level and Jeddah could still take them.

Despite Prince Sultan's announcement that Phase I will be finished in about six months, the end of construction work, like the last fence pole, seems to recede as it is approached. The human eye loses all sense of scale and distance, the mind of time. "It should be recognized," Col. Amin says, "that the approaching completion of Phase I at NJIA does not mean that construction will be completed. On the contrary, construction will continue at NJIA for years to come as major facilities are developed including the RSAF base, airline aircraft maintenance and general aviation maintenance facilities."

After a budget of SR4.5 billion was requested for the project for fiscal 1399-1400, and one of SR2.4 billion was granted, IAP was told that work should begin on the RSAF base. A plea for money has been duly entered. The areas

of work for which contracts have not been let are RSAF base aircraft maintenance, general aviation, and administration and health care. The workforce, Col. Amin says, has reached a peak of 14,500 men.

It is difficult to please all of the people all of the time. On his grand tour of the project in October, Prince Sultan was shown the South Terminal Mosque. He said, as he turned to leave, "I do not like it." The courtiers fell suddenly silent. The uncomprehending journalists and businessmen went on smiling politely.

NJIA is in the hands of some of the largest firms in the West and in Asia. The main contractor is Hochtief AG of West Germany. Architects and consultants include Edward Durrell Stone, Lockheed Aircraft International, and Yamasaki and Associates. Wackenhut of Miami, which handles security at the Alaska pipeline and fire fighting at Cape Canaveral prepared the master plan for the airport's security.

Airport projects in Saudi Arabia bring the big boys together. The list of Saudi sponsors, agents and joint venture partners reads like a Who's Who. Parsons Daniel, is a joint venture of Saudi Arabian Parsons sponsored by Gaith Pharaon's Redec and Daniel International (Saudi Arabia) whose agent is Reda Nazer, the brother of Minister of Planning Hisham Nazer. Adnan Khashoggi sponsors Lockheed, part of a group which was recently awarded the contract for NJIA's air traffic control. There have been unconfirmed reports that a consortium had coalesced to handle buildings maintenance involving Sheikh Saleh Kamel, Akram Ojeh and Prince Khaled ibn Abdullah ibn Abdul Rahman, the son of King Abdul Aziz's beloved brother and husband to a sister of Crown Prince Fahd. Bechtel, appointed construction manager for Riyadh's new international airport, is sponsored by Prince Muhammad ibn Fahd, a son of the crown prince.

All manner of superlatives have been applied to the Jeddah airport. For what they are worth, it will be larger than Manhattan Island; it will be one and one-half times as large as John F. Kennedy, La Guardia, Newark, O'Hare and Los Angeles combined; it will be equal to the combined area of Montreal, Dorval, Toronto and Dallas Fort Worth (which cost \$ 810 million). Even a visiting disco band from Virginia knew that the lights on the horizon were "that thing that's gonna be bigger than Dallas Fort Worth."

The two runways have been built to a length of 3,300 meters and 3,800 meters to give the aircraft enough room to get off the ground in weather that reduces the thrust of their engines. Running north to south because of the prevailing north wind, the runway will be fed by five aircraft aprons, taxiways, the L-1011 Maintenance and Overhaul hanger and the Air Cargo aprons and will be supervised by a control tower, which bears a disconcerting resemblance to a minaret, overlooking the

airport from a height of 60 meters. All aircraft will be fuelled hydraulically through underground pipes installed by Petrola. Eventually, the airport will have 20 mobile lounges, provided by Trepel Airport Equipment of West Germany. They will shuttle between the main terminals and the aprons and will allow 44 aircraft to park simultaneously and to leave assigned gates under their own power.

The Food Services Building is to produce 43,000 meals a week; at the Pilgrimage, 72,000 box lunches a day. Finished in February 1977 by 250 laborers, the building has 3 storeys and 16,000 cubic meters of floor space and needed 10,000 cubic meters of concrete and 1,200 tons of rebars.

The airport's 45,000-square-foot pre-cast concrete factory can produce 200 cubic meters of concrete, pre-stressed to sustain the required 5,000 pounds per square inch, every hour, 24 hours a day.

The hangar, with its 126 meter by 60 meter bay, can accommodate two TriStars at once. If there is a fire, the sensing mechanisms on the roof will set six pumps, four electric and 2 diesel, discharging 4,000 gallons of water per minute, as well as an under-wing foam system for those hard-to-reach spots.

The air cargo terminal will be capable of handling 150,000 metric tons of freight a year with a storage capacity of 7,500 metric tons at an 11-day turnover rate. It can keep 800 tons of goods refrigerated at one time.

Parking lots at the airport have been designed to accommodate 11,000 worker's cars and those of 12,850 visitors as well as 210 buses.

The South Terminal, designed by Edward Durell Stone Associates, of New York, is to handle Saudi's international and domestic flights. It is separated from a mosque by a courtyard, at the center of which is a reflecting pool, and is flanked by airport offices on one side and a 60-room hotel on the other. The 103,000 square meter complex is faced with 6,500 tons of white Italian marble. Ground was broken in 1974 and the terminal is virtually finished.

The North Terminal, also designed by Edward Durell Stone, was originally designed to handle the transport of Egyptian teachers, then Pilgrims. It has now come to rest as the terminal for foreign airlines. It can accommodate 2,500 passengers an hour.

The pipeline for the desalination plant is rapidly burrowing its way to the sea, directly to the west of the site. By January 1981, DESAL I, the first phase of the project, will be capable of providing 6,000 cubic meters of fresh water a day and when DESAL II comes on line, it will be producing a total of 10 million gallons a day. The main contract was awarded to Sumitomo.

The new Jeddah airport is as they say, a city in itself, with its own telephone network, hospitals, mosques, its planned daily population of 20,000 by 1985, its 100 flight operations an hour. And there is yet more. The Royal Pavilion and the Hajj Terminal are huge projects in their own right.

Designed by Minoru Yamasaki and Associates of Troy, Michigan, the Royal Pavilion is understood to be costing around \$100 million. Here, the King, the Royal Family and members of the government will have the use of 750 telephones, a public address system reportedly worth close to \$1 million. They will be covered by a roof of solid copper and will drive up an entrance lined with fully-grown Royal Palms flown in from Miami by Urdeo on three airplanes and planted last week.

It is at the Hajj Terminal, though, that the project surpasses itself. The white forest of pylons can already be seen from eight miles out to sea and will soon take its place beside King Saud's half-finished, crumbling beach folly as a sailor's beacon; and this with only three tenths of the 45-meter-tall pylons in place. The terminal will eventually be the largest enclosed space in the world, twice the size of the Boeing assembly plant in Seattle, a quarter as large again than the Pentagon.

The Hajj Terminal is to consist of two structures, each 750 meters by 340 meters, separated by a central mall 160 meters wide. Each of the two halves of the

complex will have an enclosed air-conditioned processing center and a larger support area open at the sides. The two structures will cover 1.5 square kilometers, or 370 acres, at the northernmost end of the airport.

Architects and engineers are awaiting the arrival of the Hajj Terminal roof as the manifestation of an architectonic ideal. Under a \$ 180 million contract, Owens Corning Saudi Contracting Services, a partnership between Owens Corning Fiberglass and the Olayan Saudi Holding Company, has developed a fibron-coated glass fiber for cladding and is to manufacture 3½ million square feet of it. The fabric will be stretched and strengthened by 32 cables radiating from a tension ring at the top, a system designed by SOM. There are to be a total of ten cable-support modules, five east and five west of the central mall, each consisting of a double row of pylons supporting twenty-one conical sections of fabric tied together. The 148-foot roof sections will sweep from 66 feet above the terminal floor at the four corners to a range of 113-foot peaks.

As construction hurtles along in the desert north of Jeddah, IAP is also looking east to Riyadh and Dhahran. A site has been selected for the Dhahran airport, 43 kilometers northwest of Dhahran and 36 kilometers west of Dammam. Construction is expected to begin in 1981 and the first phase finished four years later. Beyond that, the project is still under various stages of negotiation.

Riyadh's new airport project is beginning to pick up momentum. It is to open sometime after 1983. It is, as yet, difficult to gauge the size of the project. The insurance package for construction is worth over SR11 billion but Col. Amin says, "The size of the insurance package does not relate directly to the cost of the airport." Prince Sultan announced that SR2.8 billion has been spent to date.

Though Bechtel refused all comment, sources in Riyadh told "Saudi Business" that the following contracts have been let: primary and secondary runways, excluding the electrical system, to Philipp Holtzmann and R.E.A. Saudi

Arabia, a subsidiary of J.A. Jones for SR143 million; terminal buildings, except the Royal Pavilion, to Pegeland Son, a subsidiary of Sogex, for \$ 200 million; service links between terminals to Saudi Tarmac; Phase I of the Airport Community, which is to say where the employees will live, to Dong Ah for approximately SR200 million; the permanent power station to Mitsubishi for SR120 million.

Unlike Parsons Daniel in Jeddah, Bechtel is to supply from its own contract all primary building materials free to the contractors. The materials include ready-mix concrete, asphalt, rebars and concrete blocks under a Net Requirement Clause in each contract. Similarly, under what is known as the Project Logistics System, Bechtel handles the shipping and delivery to the site of all construction equipment, allocating specific tonnages to each company. Contractors, who are to assume responsibility for costs incurred by exceeding these limits, have complained of a system, conceived during the years of port congestion and designed to curb waste, which reduces their independence and maneuverability. But it may allow Bechtel (and IAP) to monitor costs more closely.

If the viability of Bechtel's procurement system is open to debate, what it clearly shows is the gap between stimulus and response inherent in airport construction: by the time Riyadh International Airport opens, port congestion will not have been an issue for ten years.

The construction of vast new airports for the Kingdom's three major cities and the expansion projects at their existing airports, accomplished for a price of around \$ 3 billion were based on projections of demand. In 1976, three million people passed through Jeddah airport, forty per cent of that number during the Pilgrimage. "It is estimated," Col. Amin says, "that NJIA will service more than 7.4 million passengers including 1.5 million Hajj pilgrims during the first year of operations. By 1985, it will serve approximately 11.0 million passengers."

In 1973-1974, 177,000 pilgrims arrived in the Kingdom by air. The next year, this had dropped to 113,000 as the quadrupling of oil prices took its toll of

the economies of Muslim countries.

The 1979 price rises will work out as an 80-90 per cent increase in the oil bills of developing countries. Few expect the 820,000 plus figure for foreign pilgrims in 1979 to hold steady next year.

Rather over 480,000 pilgrims arrived by air this year. If 1981 really is going to be the first year of operations, the capacity of the Pilgrimage facility will certainly not be overstretched.

IAP also justifies the three projects using such evidence as IATA's rating of Saudia in 1976 as the fastest growing airline in the world. Those in the business are aware that such companies as MEA, Alia and Saudia are beginning to take a larger slice of the international market.

Col. Amin also points to what is an inescapable social dimension to airports here. "Each airport will be one of the largest single location employers in its region, involving the direct and indirect employment of 10,000 to 12,000 people.

Through an intensive training program, the airports will provide Saudi citizens with attractive, well-paying careers at all levels." Just as the government swept aside Saudia's deficit last year of SR100 million — caused largely by subsidies on air fares — so does it continue to build airports from 'Durrayat to Rafha to 'Qaisumah. For those in the hinterland, there is no other way to be part of the country.

Saudi Arabia's three new international airports will open long after the heady days of 1973 when the quadrupling of oil prices made anything seem possible. Since then, there are those who are beginning to feel like the captors of a unicorn, gazing down with rising horror at the prize so mutilated by the struggle.

One Saudi Columnist recently wrote: "There must come a time when we stop reaching for superlatives just for their own sake, just so we can say we have the biggest." ✕



*A map of the master plan prepared by SOM*

*Airports International map*



## BRIEFS

AID TO PAKISTAN--Jeddah, Dec. 29--Saudi Arabia intends to increase its economic assistance to Pakistan with further project aid, according to local reports. AL-RIYADH said Saturday that during his meetings last week with King Khaled, President Zia ul-Haq asked for help in project finance. No specific figure was mentioned. The paper said that a team from the Saudi Fund for Development will leave for Pakistan by the end of January to assess the financial requirements of the proposed projects. The Saudi Fund for Development has already made aid available to Pakistan toward four major projects. It is paying \$80 million of the \$191 million cost of a fertilizer plant at Mirpur Medhel, \$17 million of a \$34 million polyester factory in Karachi and \$33 million of a total \$62 million toward two cement plants to feed the domestic market. An agreement was also signed in the summer for a Saudi commitment of \$90 million toward the Pipri thermal power station project, a scheme planned to supply the projected Karachi duty-free manufacturing zone. [Text] [Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 30 Dec 79 p 2]

DESALINIZATION INDUSTRY LAUNCHED--Jeddah, Dec. 21--The Kingdom's first company set up to manufacture desalination plants held its first board meeting at here Thursday, and its chairman said the meeting marks the real birth of the desalination industry here. Prince Saad Al-Faisal, chairman of the Al-Kawther Company reviewed its plans and objectives at the meeting at a Jeddah hotel and predicted a rosy future for the company. Al-Kawther is a wholly-owned Saudi Center Group and the King Faisal Foundation which is building a factory to produce small and medium size desalination plants here. Company officials said when the project was first announced last May that their aim is to produce enough of the units each year to provide fresh water for an entire city. The plant, under construction at the Jeddah Industrial Zone, will build desalination plants which use the reverse osmosis method of purifying water, in which the water is passed through a series of chemical membranes to remove salt and other impurities. Officials have said that they hope to begin production of the units by the middle of next year. The King Faisal Foundation, set up by the sons of the late King, is a philanthropic organization which invests in projects to aid technological and social development in Saudi Arabia and developing states. The Saudi Center Group is a consortium of Jeddah-based companies with interests in desalination, construction, transportation and engineering. The company's contracting division participated in construction of the second largest reverse osmosis desalting unit in the world, located in Jeddah. [Text] [Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 22 Dec 79 p 1]



## SULTANATE OF OMAN

### OMAN MAINTAINS UNIQUE POSITION IN GULF, ARAB WORLD

Paris LE MONDE in French 25,26 Dec 79

[Article by Andre Fontaine: "Oman, Guardian of the Gulf"]

[25 Dec 79, pp 1,4]

[Text] Commanding the entrance to the gulf which atlases still call Persian, the Strait of Ormuz gives the impression today of being a hot spot of international current events. One of its shores belongs to revolutionary Iran, the other comes under the sovereignty of Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id of Oman who has carried solidarity with the Western World to the point of approving the Egypto-Israeli peace. Andre Fontaine flew over the strait before being received by the sultan (whose statements will be read hereunder, and before going to visit Dhofar in the south of the country where the Omani army, 4 years after the end of the civil war, is remaining on the alert.

#### 1. The Sultan and the Mines

You take a metal box big enough to hold a van with a door in the rear that lifts up like that of a station wagon. You add two stubby wings, a square-shaped double tail section, two engines and three small wheels, you paint it all dark chestnut brown and you have a Skyvan of the Omani air force, one of the ugliest planes ever to have seen the light of day, a real challenge to aerodynamics. In consideration of which it takes off like a flea and lands in the space of a handkerchief. In any event, it is the only way to reach Ruus al Jibal and the Masseniam peninsula, in other words, the large index finger which the Arab peninsula points towards Iran in the Strait of Ormuz (or Hormuz) at the entrance to the gulf which one no longer dares call Persian.

In fact no road exists on that extremely arid promontory where some 20,000 people live as they can from their goats and their fishing at the bottom of ravines dotted here and there with microscopic fields among the tentacles

a cordillera whose pink and mauve summits reach 2,000 meters. Politics have added their complications to those of nature. On the pretext of respecting the tribal form, Great Britain, omnipotent "east of Suez" a quarter of a century ago, carved out the borders to match its interests into an extremely complex network in accordance with the ancient precept of "dividing to rule" applied by all empires with the exception of the American one.

Ras Massendam comes under the sovereignty of Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id of Oman, but it is separated from the rest of the kingdom by land belonging to the Federation of United Arab Emirates which obviously does not facilitate developing it. The federation has just settled the minor border disagreements which still existed between them, but in Muscat we heard a respectable citizen, hardly considered sympathetic to the opponents of the Omani Liberation Front, emphasize somewhat complacently that the Front considered the area to be a whole...

The plane landed at Khasab in a small plain, the only one of the territory in a setting that seemed like one in the Far West except for the dusty and skeletal grove of palm trees. A few British officers "rented out" to the sultan while awaiting the moment that will take some time to come when the Omanis take over from them, are living here, strapping men, sure of themselves and relaxed as in the days when Grandmother Victoria ruled the seas.

Their mission: Keeping watch with the sketchy native forces available to them over that famous Strait of Ormuz whose name no one, or hardly anyone, knew just a year ago, but which has achieved fame since Sheik Yamani, in an interview that won world-wide interest, declared that nothing would be easier for those fishing in troubled waters--that is certainly the case here--than obstructing it by sinking two or three tankers there. Now, an average of one ship passes here every 19 minutes, that is, 77 a day, 53 percent of them oil tankers: One-third of the world's oil traffic without which we no longer know how to exist.

#### A Not So Narrow Strait

Has the Saudi grand master of hydrocarbons ever visited the area? A trip by helicopter would have proven to him what a somewhat attentive examination of the map teaches one. Despite the reefs which appear at the surface here and there, it is quite obvious that the strait is not exactly narrow. At the time we flew over it, three supertankers were visible on the horizon. One of them was on fire and from afar one saw the black plume coming up from its poop deck. Perhaps it bore an excessively ambitious name: "Energy Determination." Three hundred thousand tons. Registered in Liberia, of course. At 0130 hours an explosion resounded on board. Fifty-seven of the 58 crewmen managed to jump into lifeboats and were picked up by an Omani patrol boat. Ten hours later, it was still burning and the completely red fireboat that came from Dubai in the Emirates, which we were to fly over on the way back, was far from being on the job. In any event it could do nothing: The tanker following another explosion was to break itself in two the following day.

The least one can say is that the accident whose effects were nevertheless of the same sort as the sabotage envisaged by Sheik Yamani seemed to bother no one. It is true that "Energy Determination" was empty on the way to be loaded in the gulf. The fact remains that one finds it hard to see how on this vast stretch of water whose breadth is close to 50 kilometers in its narrowest portion, the destruction of over several large ships could block maritime traffic in either of the two lanes it uses depending upon whether it is coming from the gulf or from the Indian Ocean. For the purpose of protecting the limited fishing of those living on the banks, the sultanate last summer was even able, without giving rise to the slightest objection, to allow itself to move closer to the median line the two lanes which ships are required to use.

That the risk mentioned by the Saudi petroleum minister was theoretical to that extent does not mean that the area is absolutely safe for all that. If Peter or Paul--or Mohammed--announced that he had laid a few mines in the strait there would be panic among the tankers. It matters little whether he actually did so: After all, the 1967 war in the Near East was provoked by the alleged laying of mines--which never occurred--at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. Moreover, that was the first issue Sultan Qabus was to cover when he received us in his Seeb palace built in the midst of a true garden of Allah filled with flowers and bird calls.

Under the cashmere turban of a delicate pink shade, the face of the Omani chief of state who is getting close to his 40's is oddly contrasted. Two large white patches on his cheeks are taking over his black beard trimmed like that of Hussein of Jordan, belying the youthfulness of a look whose gentleness conceals a sort of detachment. Educated at British schools, including Sandhurst, the English Coetquidan, having served for a while in the army of the Rhine, the sultan handles Shakespeare's language with elegance and in many respects is more Westernized than most of his cousins in the area if only for the fact that he is monogamous. Married for some 18 months, he still has no son which in an Arab monarchy does pose a few problems. And he seems to see no drawback in having his British adviser for public affairs, Anthony Ashworth, sitting in as a silent witness to the conversation. Actually, everyone gives this former Foreign Office diplomat whose accent and impeccable military bearing reveals that he was also a cavalry officer, the credit for being very influential. It was at the sultan's request that he cancelled his departure for a retirement he intends to spend in Hong Kong.

The sultan who is said to be a great admirer of the King of Morocco on foreign policy stands to the far right in the Arab world. He is the only one with President Nemeiry of the Sudan who since then has moved some distance away from Cairo, to have approved the Egypto-Israeli peace. He was to tell us in the clearest terms that in his view petroleum should not serve as a political weapon in seeking a solution to the Palestinian problem, for "one shouldn't play with fire." He professed overt hostility in a speech delivered last 18 November on the occasion of the national day to what he called "the untridled pursuit by the USSR of an expansionist policy recalling the worst periods of the colonialism of the past." In it he also charged the Soviets of "representing a very serious threat to world peace and in particular to the peace of the area."

Sultan Qabus was nevertheless careful not to attack Moscow directly in front of us. When we asked him what he was thinking of when he spoke of possible mine layers in the Strait of Ormuz, he categorically rejected a question about the PLO--although it is very difficult for a Palestinian to get into Oman--and replied: "Any trouble maker, the Japanese Red Army, for example, but everyone knows what is in back of it."

#### "We Have No Intention of Sharing Our Responsibilities"

[Question] In your 18 November address, you noted that there had been no easing of world tension and that your country would henceforth be faced with great responsibilities...

[Answer] The threat has always existed, but Iran was contributing to its containment. Today, it is no longer there to help us. That is what imposes these new responsibilities on us, ones we have no intention whatsoever of sharing with anyone else at all.

[Question] How do you assess the recent events in Teheran?

[Answer] I will be careful not to interfere in the affairs of another country. I can only hope that things will get better.

[Question] You recently put forward a plan for protecting the Strait of Ormuz. Of what does it consist?

[Answer] We want to be capable of sweeping any mine that might be laid in the strait, as well as of exercising constant surveillance over any movement by a suspect ship. We also want to be able to extinguish fires. You have seen how long it took for the fireboat over which you flew to reach the wrecked tanker that caught fire. We must therefore be in a position to establish at least a small naval base at Khasab. All that involves sizable means which we obviously are not able to provide on our own... That is why we have called for a financial contribution from the countries concerned: the gulf's riparian states, Europe, the United States.

[Question] But isn't it a little paradoxical to ask revolutionary Iraq to join in a system in which the United States would also participate...

[Answer] Iraq has no less interest than the other states of the area in reducing tensions which could damage the security of its commerce."

Let us put in parenthetical comments here. Contrary to what people in the West tend to think no tension of any kind is felt here. If the number of Uncle Sam's warships moving about in the vicinity has definitely been on the increase since the beginning of the affair of the Teheran hostages, the same is not true of that of the Soviet units which is apparently even perceptibly smaller, according to a well-informed American source, than what it was 2 years ago. In fact, the Red fleet in the immediate vicinity is present only in the form of a spy ship. It remains constantly in the small space which is beyond the Omani and Iranian territorial waters in the Strait of Ormuz.

Where it is, if one is to believe the smiling commander in chief--"made in Britain," of course--of the sultan's small fleet, its indiscreet ears sweep a far larger field than can those of the Anglo-Omanis whose listening post is at present established on Massendam Island. But next year it will be moved toward the middle of the channel onto the Great Qoin rock a few cable lengths from its rival come in out of the cold.

Let us also add a detail: Despite everything people may have said, there is no American naval base at Masirah off the coast of central Oman, for the good reason that the configuration of this island, entirely edged by cliffs, does not make it possible to drop anchor. In fact, it is mainly used for aviation training which obviously does not prevent planes from the "Kitty Hawk" from landing there should the need arise. But the real United States base in the area is still Diego Garcia Island, it being understood that they have at Bahrein what it has been agreed to called substantial "facilities," and that it is not the Omanis who prevent their ships from putting into port in their waters.

#### The Chances for a Solution to the Palestinian Problem Are Still Serious

Closing the parenthetical comments, let us go back to Sultan Qabus to talk with him, this time about the prospects afforded by the Egypto-Israeli peace. In his opinion, the chances of a solution to the Palestinian problem remain as serious as at the time of Camp David.

"But it is very important for the Palestinians to be given internal autonomy as quickly as possible in such a way that they may utilize the 5-year period granted by the peace treaty to determine the kind of government they want."

[Question] How is this to be achieved? Shouldn't the United States exert more pressure on Israel?

[Answer] Not only the United States which will surely do its best. The door has been opened, the basic problem is to create trust.

[Question] A difficult task...

[Answer] Time resolves matters. Once they have understood that the Egyptians did not take that initiative solely for their own interests, but also for those of the Palestinians, once the latter benefit from internal autonomy, there will be more and more people among them who will think that good results can be obtained."

Then we came to oil. Though a small producer (300,000 barrels a day) as compared with its gulf neighbors, the sultanate derives most of its resources from exploiting it. If it did not join OPEC, the sultan told us, it was because it wants to retain the possibility of fixing its prices as it wishes. Moreover, it did not wait for Caracas to increase the minimum price per barrel to \$30, the basic rate beginning at which it puts up to auction that part of its production not included in bilateral contracts. But when we



raised the idea of a Marshall plan for the Third World, which has been talked about a great deal in recent times, he replied that it did not seem bad to him and, in that connection, hailed the Algerian proposal for the creation of a poor countries' bank though in his view it still needs to be studied in depth.

The sultan concluded the discussion by referring to his country's development. He is aware of all the factors of dependence weighing upon him but believes, "Inch Allah," that the prospects opened up by the new 5-year plan are decidedly favorable.

"We have discovered water which we are going to be able to use for farming. After all, this country was formerly an agricultural country. We also have available many mineral resources--copper, chromium, manganese, coal. We can already say that in 9 years we have gone from nothing to something: In the fields of health, education, communications, our achievements are significant and added together they lay the foundations for Oman of tomorrow.

[Question] But doesn't the country's economic development require institutional changes?

[Answer] This development was based on Omani and Arab traditions and it is within this same framework that I envisage the future. I do not believe in the utility of importing the systems of others which do not fit our needs. But I am convinced that we will know how to find the path to a kind of modern democratic system which will satisfy this country's inhabitants. It is in that direction that I have endeavored to guide my people from the beginning and I am convinced that it will be possible to involve people more and more in the task as time goes by."

[26 Dec 79 p 4]

## 2. From Civil War to Modernization

[Text] A few hundred meters from the long beach bordered by coconut palms which indefatigable crabs cover with thousands of little hillocks of sand, a small military airfield: A half dozen Big Lifters, heavy helicopters made in the United States and serving to supply isolated villages as well as the soldiers, two or three Defender patrol planes and the inevitable Skyvan flying trucks.\*

Before flying off to the border with South Yemen, an "icebox" coming from the mists of the English Channel one or another applicant for passage raises like a feather to reassure itself as to its lightness. With his revolver slapping against his hip and his bush knife slipped into the alf pocket of his flight suit, one might think for a moment that he was taking off on a mopping up operation.

Yet the civil war is no more than a memory at the present time and it is rather hard to imagine that 5 years ago the major portion of Dhofar, including

\*LE MONDE 25 December

the port of Raykut, was still in the hands of a liberation front claiming adherence to Marxism-Leninism and, until the day the Chinese who were very interested in it, let it drop for the sake of reasons of state, to Maoism. Since then the Chinese have become the eager allies of anyone proclaiming his hostility to the Soviet version of communism. As this is the case of Oman, the red flag of the Chinese People's Republic now waves over a small embassy in Muscat.

Things on the spot have also changed. With the help of the British, the present sultan, Qabus, on 23 July 1970 put an end to the over lengthy reign of his father, Sultan Sa'id, who had had him interned distrusting his taste for Brahms and his modernistic tendencies acquired on the banks of the Thames and of the Rhine. This obscurantist autocrat carried his hatred of the century to the point of banning tobacco, music, photography and the wearing of dark sunglasses. At that time in the entire country there were one hospital with 12 beds, 10 kilometers of paved roads and three primary schools for a million inhabitants. A number of young Omanis had either joined the ranks of a rebellion for which official propaganda retrospectively seems to find some excuse, or went abroad to study.

#### Broad Reforms

On his accession, the new sultan launched broad reforms the results of which are beginning to show. Many exiles and opposition elements returned soon joined by members of a Diaspora born in the glorious days of the Omani fleet. Like the citizen of Burundi with the most handsome black skin who justified his coming to Muscat on the basis of his sultanesque ancestors. Like the doctor trained in the USSR who brought back from there a blonde wife, she too a doctor and who, having become a subject of the sultan, now practices in the capital without any problems.

The government has widely taken advantage of the country's relative modernization to convince the rebels that their uprising no longer has any meaning. With the help of Great Britain, Iran and Jordan, at the military level it thoroughly exploited the wavering created in their ranks by the Chinese defection. South Yemen's progressive regime, which is totally supported by the USSR, by East Germany and Cuba, has taken over from Peking. Nonetheless, since 1975 fighting has virtually ceased. Jordanians and Iranians have left. If one is to believe the officials, there remain scarcely more than some 30 outlaws in Dhofar--"Mesrines," a Frenchman told us--who are isolated and chiefly concerned with surviving in a difficult environment.

For the commander in chief of the Omani fleet who brought back to the Strait of Ormuz, which in his view is more threatened, such and such a unit hitherto occupied in watching over, even bombing, the coastal road by which the rebels received from South Yemen a considerable share of their supplies, nothing leads one to foresee a renewal of guerrilla activities. In the immediate vicinity of the border, another British officer met at the command post of one of the six regiments entrusting with defending Dhofar, is less categorical: "The day they attack, they will give no warning." "They" are the

few hundreds of maquis elements who are waiting, arms at hand, in the immediate proximity of Omani territory, Aden's and Moscow's green light. Should the situation become a little tense in the Strait of Ormuz, it might be tempting for the progressive camp to create an explosive situation here.

So the sultan's forces remain on a war footing. Small forts of large stones are scattered over the heights in the populated area extending along the coast as well as on the initial spurs, which the monsoon will cover with greenery once summer has come, of a mountain rising in vertiginous degrees up to the desert where incense and gum arabic are gathered. Lookouts stand watch 24 hours out of 24, their fingers on their machineguns' triggers, over what is happening on the other side of the frontier.

But the latter is not as closed as this martial apparatus might lead one to think. From time to time one or two rebels cross it to make their submission. South Yemeni nomads attracted by what they hear said of the sultanate's prosperity also cross over.

Obviously, prosperity is a strong term. With its 300,000 barrels of petroleum a day, from which it derives the main part of its revenue, the sultanate gives the impression of a poor relation in comparison with Saudi Arabia or the gulf emirates. But these slender means encourage the leaders on the whole to avoid extravagances which so many of those made wealthy by the black gold permit themselves. To say that corruption is completely absent would obviously be going a bit far, and there is more than one minister who increases his official activities with the enviable occupation of "sponsoring" some major foreign enterprise. In the residential districts of Medinat-Qabus or of Qurum on the outskirts of Muscat a few villas stand that must have cost an arm and a leg. And nothing was spared to turn the grandiloquent palace built for the sultan in his capital, at the risk of somewhat upsetting its slightly antiquated charm, a residence worthy of a great prince.

Most public buildings, however, still have reasonable dimensions and comfort and one can only praise the very major effort made where equipment is concerned. There are now 1,500 kilometers of paved roads and 3 years from now paving 1,200 kilometers between Muscat to Salalah, the capital of Dhofar, will be completed. Thirteen hospitals, which are, of course, still far from being enough, have been opened.

One can see schoolboys and girls everywhere in their sensible uniforms, satchels or attache cases in their hands: Officially, there are 88,000 of them, of whom 27,000 are girls, taking the courses of teachers, the great majority of whom are foreigners, especially Egyptians. In Salalah we were able to visit a girls school--which would be unthinkable for a man in the neighboring countries: Their faces uncovered, framed by a white veil that made them look like little nuns, they seemed to be listening very attentively to their women teachers, all in long skirts, including a little American woman who has been teaching the rudiments of her own language to her pupils since September. Hundreds of Omani students attend Arab, European

universities--there are some 15 in France--and American universities, and in a few years the opening in the sultanate of two or three colleges for higher education is envisaged. Finally, thousands of adults get literacy lessons at the end of the day.

#### Petroleum After the Year 2000

Sultan Qabus hasn't too many worries over money despite defense costs which take up around 50 percent of the regular budget. Saudi Arabia, in fact, has not hesitated in recent years to make up its budgetary deficit. Funds are not lacking, Japanese at the head of the list, for petroleum held in place whose daily production is sold at auction on the spot. Getting the exploitation of the Dhofar deposits, to be linked to Muscat by an oil pipeline in the near future, under way will make it possible to increase extraction by about 20 percent next year and PDO [Petroleum Development of Oman] is already declaring with assurance that the sultanate will still have petroleum after the year 2000.

PDO is a state within the state, 60 percent of the shares are in the hands of the Omani state, most of the rest in those of Shell, the French petroleum firm holding 4 percent as its share. The map of its production areas covers the major part of the sultanate. But six other groups have operations in the remaining areas, among them Elf-Aquitaine which extracts 12,000 barrels a day offshore of Ras-Massendam and, more fortunate than PDO, which had given up prospecting in that area, has found petroleum in the Rub-Al-Khali, that is, in the empty quarter, the vast desert covering the southern part of Saudi Arabia and spilling over its border on the Omani side.

Some tens of technicians of different nationalities are working there, braving temperatures that in the spring get up to 50 degrees Celsius in the shade--but where is there any shade? The orange sand dunes whose crests stand out against the unpolluted sky alternate with stretches of pebbles or brown earth in which here and there scrub of an unexpected green, nourished by goodness knows what water, is planted.

Around the curve of a hill, two bulldozers were leveling the road which the vibrators, the most recent creations of the technology used in petroleum prospecting, will be using. We saw three heavy trucks of elephantine girth a little further on, moving ahead for 10 meters, resting on a sort of peduncle coming out of their mid section so as to raise their back wheels, then began to vibrate together like drills, rested and started off again to start the same operation over again for hours. Two or 3 kilometers from there a young Englishman closed up in a truck chilled by refrigeration. He was seeing to the proper functioning of the oscillography which records the reactions of the different sedimentary layers to the miniseisms caused by the vibrators. The data provided in this way are then entrusted to a computer which derives from them indications as to the structure of the bed rock and hence as to the possibility of petroleum being present.



There isn't just petroleum. The sultanate also has natural gas which supplies both the capital's electric power plant and its desalination plant. A copper deposit will begin to be exploited in 1981 and during the first year the production of about 20,000 tons is anticipated. Prognostications are more cautious on chromium and manganese whose extraction costs risk being prohibitive.

The results of agriculture now perceptibly exceed the goals assigned to it by the second 5-year plan. To the traditional "falaj," narrow irrigation canals bringing water from the mountains down to the plain, are added more modern pumping techniques, the ground water being relatively close, especially in the coastal area of Dhofar where the monsoon makes possible both tropical crops and the creation of huge farms devoted to stock raising and to the production of cattle fodder.

A traveler accustomed so often to seeing skeletal cows or buffalo in the Third World is astonished to encounter fine milch cows not only at centers, now no longer experimental, but on the heights where semi-nomadic people live, around their circular dwelling places dug into the earth and topped by a cupola braced with boughs. Fishing is also being fully developed thanks to the supplying of Japanese outboard motors to the fishermen and to the better surveillance of the coast undertaken by the sultan's navy.

#### The Slow Progress of "Omanization"

As we have already had occasion to mention, this navy is commanded by a British officer. He does not even have an Omani deputy for the good reason that none of the six native naval officers has yet risen about the rank of ensign. Thus, if "Omanization" is laid down in the program, it will take time. How much? We asked the commander in chief that question. Reply: "His Majesty does not intend to entrust a command to anyone who does not possess all of the qualifications required to exercise it." Which means that for the position he holds one would have to allow... "25 years." But our interlocutor immediately added: "It is clear that this is far too long. We will have to settle for something unsatisfactory."

Things will move ahead more quickly in the ground army where taking over at the top is forecast for 1981. But it is obvious that for some time yet London's influence in the sultanate will remain very strong. The sovereign does not seem to worry about that too much. It is not certain, however, that considering the spirit of the times, there may not be more and more people in Oman who will consider that presence a nuisance. Similarly, it is hard to imagine that the sultan will continue *ad vitam aeternam* to hold virtually all powers. Qabus ibn sa'id is quite aware of the need for a change in that he told TIME last June: "Fire power, color television and air conditioning cannot be enough to satisfy a people wanting its own parliament. Such is the message of the 20th century to which kings, shahs, sultans and emirs must yield. And dictators too." Nevertheless, there is nothing to indicate that he is in any great rush to make any moves along those lines.



It is true that it is hard to imagine a more peaceful country and that the smiles and the enthusiasm with which foreigners are welcomed in the most remote villages give the impression of a people quite untroubled and content with its lot. The fact is that in contrast to events in neighboring Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen or Ethiopia, Oman appears to be an oasis of calm. But one must beware of still waters. In their part of the world the Omanis are quite unlikely to be forgotten by history. They are all the more aware of that because, in contrast to their neighbors, they have had a long history themselves. Weren't they the very ones who expelled the Persians who occupied their coasts in the 17th and 18th centuries?

France would be making a mistake to neglect this live country with which its trading has just undergone a spectacular expansion thanks to the concluding by Alstom of a contract for the delivery of alternators. By being on hand, in addition to petroleum, in various sectors of activity ranging from the processing of mineral water to the delivery of Exocet missiles, to the naval patrol boats, it would certainly find its influence increased if the president of the Republic took advantage of the trip he is to make to the emirates in the spring to call on Sultan Qabus.

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CSO: 4800

MISTRUST IN ARAB-U.S. RELATIONS REMAINS WIDESPREAD

Abu Dhabi AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 17 Nov 79 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text] The American Embassy crisis demonstrates a new lesson.

Those who believed that the United States could be an oasis of security for their assets, revenues, and reserves must now have discovered how mistaken and deceived they have been.

Those who escaped the "leak" and the seizure and nationalization operations fell under the "drainspout" with confiscation occurring in broad daylight, under the protection of "democratic laws" and before the eyes and ears of the entire world.

What has happened to Iran may not induce it to give in to the threat, but it clearly exposes the fragility of the view held by the defenders of investment abroad, and the fragility of the stage setting of security whose image is the Western financial institutions, especially those in the United States.

If there are some who think that what Washington did with the Iranian assets in its banks and financial institutions is an exceptional action connected with the hostage situation in the American Embassy in Tehran, then they can calculate the probability of an exceptional circumstance's arising between the United States and the Arab states, and the probability that Washington could resort to dealing with such a circumstance by a decision similar to the one it made regarding Iranian assets.

The nature of relations between the United States and the Arab states will be full of pitfalls as long as Washington snubs the principles of justice by its view of the Arab-Zionist struggle, and we will not be able to fortify our revenues and assets in American banks and organizations against confiscation unless we are ready to sacrifice our national rights and pawn our political will side by side with our pawned assets in the American banks.

8591

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ARAB CAPITAL SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM U.S. BANKS

Abu Dhabi AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 18 Nov 79 pp 1,12

[Editorial by Rashid ibn 'Uwaydah: "The Lesson Gained From the Confrontation Between Iran and America"]

[Text] The hot confrontation between the United States and Iran, which is expected to become even hotter in the coming days, has brought to light more than one lesson which the Arab states must learn.

Observers of the American administration's actions in its confrontation with the Islamic revolution have noted a number of facts which will not be modified in any other confrontation between America and any of the oil states which hold assets, property, or investments in the United States.

Far removed from the information commotion which America is carrying on against the Islamic revolution in Iran, and far removed from the statements of the students who are holding the hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran, we say that what the Arabs had believed to be weapons in their hands--such as their oil wealth and the billions of dollars in American banks--may suddenly have become weapons which America could use against them in a conflict with any one of the Arab states.

Aside from being a dangerous precedent in international relations, the United States' resort to seizure of the Iranian people's assets and property in America is an indication that America has begun to use Zionist methods to control the resources of the peoples of the world.

We do not find such behavior by the American administration strange, because many American officials are unable to free themselves from Zionist notions that they have every right to control the peoples' resources.

The image of the Zionist is well known in the Arab world, as is the image of the greed which strives to steal and oppress everything which is not Zionist. A measure such as that undertaken by the American administration reveals another side of the phases of confrontation and provocation which America could initiate in order to force the peoples of the world to remain under their control.

If the lesson which the Arab states should derive from the confrontation between Iran and America is perfectly clear, the failure to learn this lesson now would mean that those Arab states which hold deposits in American banks will one day find themselves subject to the same action which America is taking against the Iranian people.

There are tens of billions of Arab dollars on deposit in American banks. According to estimates by economic experts, the monetary liquidity amassed by OPEC outside its own states had reached \$140 billion by the end of last year, most of it from the Arab oil-producing states. This means that Arab assets are subject to the will of America and constitute an instrument of pressure against the Arab states rather than a weapon in their hands--a situation which make it incumbent on Arab officials to give serious study to the withdrawal of assets and the halting of investments in the United States, lest these assets remain prisoner of the Zionist thinking which has begun to assert itself within the American administration through the confrontation between Tehran and Washington.

The Tunis summit has before it an opportunity to derive the benefits of the lessons learned in the war which has been declared in various ways between Iran and America.

The first of these lessons is that Arab assets in America, whether in the form of deposits, investments, or property, are in a dangerous place. The safe place is Arab territory, whether the oil remains within it or the revenues return to it.

The second lesson is that the Arab states cannot remain economically subservient to America and subject to its policies. The Arab summit must investigate using oil revenues--after they are withdrawn from American banks--to build an Arab economy which does not accept the pressure tactics and food warfare which America is now launching against Iran.

Only Arab territory can provide security for the Arab, and it needs all the Arab assets abroad to provide security for the citizen and protection for his future.

These lessons are clear and plain. It is up to the Arab summit to benefit from them and deprive Zionist methods of the opportunity to tighten their hold on the Arab nation.

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WESTERN OIL FIRMS GIVE MISLEADING OIL RESERVE ESTIMATES

Abu Dhabi AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 14 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial by Rashid ibn 'Uwaydah: "Oil: Between Secret Reports and Public Estimates"]

[Text] The startling oil estimates revealed yesterday by AL-WAHDAH impose a prodigious responsibility on Arab leaders at the Tunis summit who are demanding studied and practical plans to protect the future of Arab mankind.

These estimates, which we obtained from secret reports prepared by specialist oil circles, indicate that Arab oil wealth will be depleted faster than the Arabs can correct the situation unless prompt and practical measures are taken to prevent this from happening. Optimistic and firm estimates indicate that oil wells in the Arab states will start to be depleted at the beginning of the 1980's and will reach their minimum production levels in the next 10 years.

What These Estimates Mean

They mean first of all that Arab officials have been, and probably still are, receiving estimates, studies, and forecasts which are inaccurate. There are some agencies, tied by economic interests to the monopolistic companies and industrialized states, which are anxious to provide the Arab states with what they describe as "facts" about the oil situation. These facts state that Arab oil will last for the next 50 or 60 years.

Of course, the purpose behind disseminating and leaking such erroneous and misleading estimates to Arab officials is well known. The industrialized states are totally dependent on Arab oil as a cheap source of energy, and it is no exaggeration to say that the conduct of the industrial civilizations and entities in the Western states relies on large measure on Arab oil. The luxury of the peoples of the industrialized world also depends on extracting our oil resources, as is best indicated by the serious disarray and predicament in which the industrialized states find themselves on account of a slight drop in oil production in any Arab country.



The facts which we revealed yesterday also mean that the Arab oil states which used to believe that they were sitting on the world's oil throne--in terms of both reserves and production--will be surprised by the future oil developments to find themselves incapable of providing even those quantities of oil needed for local consumption in their own states. At that time, what tragedy could be more serious for the Arab oil states than finding themselves caught unaware, without the quantities of oil needed to produce electric energy or to light their cities?

Thirdly, these facts mean that the industrialized states and their monopolistic companies which have presented false figures concerning future reserves of oil in the Arab states are carrying on fierce competition among themselves to extract Arab oil resources in order to meet the needs of their industries and expand their economies. The industrialized states consume vast and ever-growing quantities of oil at the expense of Arab reserves which should be put into the service of Arab development and its requirements, not in the service of the luxury of the peoples of the industrialized states.

At the close of these remarks, we pose the following question: What have the Arab states accomplished with the oil they have produced? And what can they accomplish with the scant reserves they have left?

The Arab citizen knows the truth before the official. But will the Arab summit get as far as these questions?

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